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Abstract
The recent decade has witnessed an extraordinary degree of innovation in the financial sector.
Developments in financial technology, computing power, and networking theory have allowed
decentralized online platforms such as Bitcoin to fundamentally change the way that financial
services are provided. While these innovations have been applauded by many as bringing a
welcome degree of competition to a sector long dominated by powerful incumbents, they also
create a set of challenges for current financial regulation. How do fiduciary standards apply to
algorithms? How does online finance affect the behavior of investors? And more generally,
how can regulators monitor and constrain the financial industry when it is increasingly run by
autonomous, dispersed computer networks? This Article argues that current financial
regulation is inadequate to address the unique problems presented by the rise of Bitcoin and
other fintech industries. In particular, these innovations raise concerns about the ability of
financial regulation to promote three inter-related financial goals: the efficient allocation of
capital, the protection of consumers, and the prevention of systemic risk. These goals, at the
core of current approaches to financial regulation, are all challenged by fintech's defining
feature: its reliance on disembodied institutions and complex algorithms for its functioning.
These traits render the traditional tools used by regulators to discipline markets-substantive
behavioral obligations, the threat of sanctions, and the constraining effect of reputation- largely
ineffective. The Article concludes by proposing a set of principles to guide lawmakers in
designing a more effective financial regulatory structure for the Bitcoin era.
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Financial Regulation in the Bitcoin Era
Introduction
The recent decade has witnessed an extraordinary degree of innovation in the
financial sector. Upstart financial technology (or "fintech") firms have introduced a
dizzying area of new financial products and services into the market. Online
crowdfunding platforms such as Kickstarter and LendingClub have changed the way
that companies and individuals raise capital. Digital robo-advisors have challenged
the business models of investment advisors and asset managers alike. And, most
emblematically, cryptocurrencies such as Bitcoin have emerged as viable alternatives
to traditional national currencies. The new Bitcoin era, defined by the rapid
proliferation of fintech firms into an ever broader array of industries, has altered the
landscape of finance in fundamental ways.
Financial regulators across the world are starting to take notice of these changes.
Several regulators, such as the Securities Exchange Commission and the Office of the
Comptroller in the United States, have issued white papers and sought comments on
how, and whether, current regulations should apply to fintech companies.' Others
have cracked down on fintech actors, finding that many of them fail to comply with
existing financial rules.2 Still others have created "regulatory sandboxes" for fintech
firms, allowing them to operate under relaxed compliance regimes in order to
encourage experimentation and innovation. 3 The diverse array of policy proposals
and enforcement initiatives in recent months reflects, among other things, the great
difficulty that regulators have had in fashioning appropriate regulatory responses to
the rapid rise of the Bitcoin era.
This Article aims to identify the most salient features of the Bitcoin era, describe
the problems that these features raise for financial regulation, and sketch out potential
reforms that might better address these new problems. It argues that the Bitcoin era's
unique model of finance raises concerns about the ability of regulators to achieve three
essential goals of financial regulation: the efficient allocation of capital, the protection
of consumers, and the prevention of systemic risk. Each of these goals is undermined
1. See SEC. ExcH. COMM'N., INVESTOR BULLETIN: INITIAL COIN OFFERINGS (2017),
https://www.sec.gov/oiea/investor-alerts-and-bulletins/ib coinofferings; OFFICE OF
THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, SUPPORTING RESPONSIBLE INNOVATION IN THE FEDERAL
BANKING SYSTEM: AN OCC PERSPECTIVE (2016).
2. See Chao Deng, China's Interference on Bitcoin Tests Currency's Foundation, WALL ST. J.(Sept. 18, 2017), https://www.wsj.com/articles/china-widens-bitcoin-crackdown-
beyond-commercial-trading-1505733976.
3. See Max Colchester & Rachel Witkowski, U.K. Takes Novel Approach on Fin tech, WALL ST.
J. (Apr. 11, 2016), https://www.wsj.com/articles/u-k-takes-novel-approach-on-fintech-
1460370600; Michelle Chen & Michelle Price, Hong Kong to Launch Banking Fintech
"Sandbox" As Rivals Pull Ahead, REUTERS (Sept. 6, 2016),
https://w-ww.reuters.com/article/us-hongkong-banks-regulator/hong-kong-to-
launch-fintech-sandbox-as-rivals-pull-ahead-idUSKCN11COEV; Clare Dickinson, Bank of
England Gathers Minds for Fintech Salon, FIN. NEWS (Mar. 17, 2017),
https://www.fnlondon.com/articles/bank-of-england-gathers-minds-for-fintech-salon-
20170317.
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by the Bitcoin era's defining features - a reliance on disembodied institutions, complex
algorithms, and frequent adaptation to provide an evolving set of financial services to
consumers. These features render the conventional tools of financial regulators largely
ineffective by increasing the cost of identifying, monitoring and sanctioning market
participants. In order to resolve these problems, financial regulation must find new
tools that are better designed to address the unique structure of the Bitcoin era.
4
"
This Article proceeds in four parts. First, it identifies the key features of fintech
firms that distinguish them from traditional financial institutions. Fintech industries
tend to be typified by high levels of diffusion, in that market actors are small and
dispersed rather than large and concentrated. Fintech industries tend to rely on high
levels of automation, in that they rely on algorithms and big data for their essential
functions. And fintech industries tend to demonstrate high frequencies of adaptation,
in that they undergo significant structural transformations in response to changes in
market conditions. Thus, an initial aim of the Article is'to taxonomize the core features
of the Bitcoin era and demonstrate how these features are different in important ways
from traditional finance.
Second, the Article assesses the consequences of fintech's structure on the efficacy
of current financial regulation. The Article argues that fintech's unique model of
finance places pressure on, and indeed undermines, several core purposes of financial
regulation. It may reduce the capacity of the financial sector to allocate capital
efficiently within the economy. It may increase the likelihood that consumer
protections will be weakened or evaded. And it raises a set of systemic risk concerns
that are potentially more troubling than the "too big to fail" concerns that have
motivated recent financial reform efforts. Thus, an additional aim of the Article is to
demonstrate the existential difficulties that the Bitcoin era poses for financial
regulation.
Third, the Article proposes a set of reforms aimed at creating a "law of fintech"
that better addresses the particular features and risks of the Bitcoin era. It argues that
the law of fintech should focus on three overriding priorities. First, regulators should
adopt a set of information forcing rules requiring fintech actors to disseminate accurate
and comprehensive information about fintech products. Second, regulators should
adopt a set of security forcing rules requiring fintech firms to adopt cybersecurity
procedures that match the level of idiosyncratic risk they present to consumers,
investors and third parties. And third, regulators should establish a set of tradeoff
4. In their article, Fintech and the Innovation Trilemma, Chris Brurnmer and Yesha Yadav
argue that fintech presents a difficult quandary for financial regulators. Chris Brummer
& Yesha Yadav, Fintech and the Innovation Trilemma, GEO. L.J. (forthcoming 2018), available
at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=3054770. They persuasively
demonstrate that regulators cannot simultaneously "provide clear rules, maintain market
integrity, and encourage financial innovation." Id. at 1. They describe how fintech
exacerbates these problems and survey a range of regulatory strategies for responding to
them. Id. at 39-56. As will be described further below, this Article agrees with many of
their recommendations, but, by focusing on different aspects of fintech and financial
regulation, comes to different conclusions about the appropriate scope of reform. In any
event, Brurmmer and Yadav's article provides an essential baseline for future work in the
area.
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forcing rules requiring fintech firms and government authorities alike to explicitly
acknowledge the policy tradeoffs of their decisions.
The Article concludes by addressing a set of objections to its central proposals. In
particular, it considers and rejects two arguments related to the ineffectiveness of
information and the deleterious effects of improved cybersecurity on national security.
It concludes that these objections, while powerful in the abstract, can be mitigated
through smart interventions and commonsense compromise.
I. The Structure of The Bitcoin Era
This Part argues that the Bitcoin era, while covering a wide array of financial
services and encompassing a disparate group of actors, is characterized by three core
features. First, it is typified by a high degree of diffusion, that is, fintech actors tend to
be small and dispersed rather than large and concentrated. Second, it tends to rely
heavily on algorithmic automation for many of their essential functions. Third, it is
typified by frequent and sudden bursts of adaptation.5 These three characteristics -
diffusion, automation, and adaptation- allow fintech firms to compete with
established financial institutions despite the presence of high barriers to entry in the
market. And while the particular services offered by fintech firms vary significantly,
from virtual currencies to robo-advice to e-payment services to crowdfunding, these
key features remain central to their business models.
Before proceeding, it may be worthwhile as an initial matter to set forth the
parameters of the discussion. The Bitcoin era will be used to refer to the period,
beginning in the past decade and ramping up in the last few years, in which fintech
actors have emerged as major players in the financial world. As with any effort to
identify distinct periods of history, it is impossible to identify a specific date on which
the Bitcoin era begins, but to give a sense of the time period in which this era emerged,
a few important events are helpful. Satoshi Nakamoto first announced his idea for
5. Brummer and Yadav argue that fintech has "three key features" that differentiate it from
previous models of financial innovation:
"(i) a dependence on vast quantities of conventional as well as novel types of
data in the design of fintech products; (ii) the automation of algorithmic
programs that often showcase advances in artificial intelligence and machine
learning; and (iii) the emergence of non-traditional, specialist firms whose
business models seek to disintermediate financial transactions and take on the
dominance of brand-name 'one-stop-shop' Wall Street firms."
Brummer & Yadav, supra note 4, at 27-28. We agree that categories (ii) and(iii) are core features of the Bitcoin era but would argue that Brummer and
Yadav's category (i) would most usefully be included under their category(ii). In addition, we would argue that fintech industries also display a third
category of adaptation, that is, high levels of change in response to external
circumstances. But generally, we agree that these features, however one
typologizes them, create a set of difficult problems for regulators, as described
further below in Part II.
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Bitcoin on October 31, 2008;6 the prominent crowdfunding company Kickstarter was
founded on April 28, 2009;7 and the first robo-advisor, Betterment, was founded some
time in 2008.8 "Fintech" will be used to refer to the new breed of companies and
organizations that specialize in providing financial services through technologically-
enabled mobile and online platforms. 9While the term fintech is sometimes used to
describe any use of technology in finance, 10 this generic use of the term tends to
obscure the categorical differences between recent developments in finance and
previous generations of financial development.11 Fintech organizations rely on the
internet, website, smartphones and other technologies to produce and deliver their
financial services to consumers and investors. Thus, fintech and the Bitcoin era,
together, capture a wide range of companies and developments, from Bitcoin to
Kickstarter to Venmo, all of which have inserted themselves into previously staid
financial industries and created new methods for facilitating transactions.
A. Diffusion
In recent years, a number of scholars and policymakers have argued that the
increasingly concentrated nature of the financial sector has created a number of serious
6. See NATHANIEL POPPER, DIGITAL GOLD: BrrcOIN AND THE INSIDE STORY OF THE MISFITS AND
MILLIONAIRES TRYING TO REINVENT MONEY 383 (2016).
7. See Lisa Waananen, Three Years of Kickstarter Projects, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 30, 2012.
8. See Michael Wursthom, $10 Billion Robo-Adviser Betterment Flourishes as Chief Learns to Let
Go, WALL ST. J., Sept. 1, 2017.
9. Other efforts to define the field have reached similar conclusions. See OFFICE OF THE
COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, SUPPORTING RESPONSIBLE INNOVATION IN THE FEDERAL
BANKING SYSTEM: AN OCC PERSPECTIVE (2016); ECONOMIST, THE DISRUPTION OF BANKING 2
n.2 (defining fintech as "new entrants that use Intemet-based and mobile technologies to
create new or superior banking products"), available at
https:/ /www.eiuperspectives.economist.com/sites/default/ files/EIU-
The%20disruption%20of%20bankingPDF_0.pdf; NATIONAL ECONOMIC COUNCIL, A
FRAMEWORK FOR FNTECH 2 (2017), available at
https://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2017/01/13/framework-fintech (defining fintech
as a "wide spectrum of technological innovations which impact a broad range of financial
activities, including payments, investment management, capital raising, deposits and
lending, insurance, regulatory compliance, and other activities in the financial services
space").
10. See Tom C. W. Lin, Infinite Financial Intermediation, 50 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 643, 655-56
(2015) (arguing that " [t]his type of substitutive disintermediation is more superficial than
substantive in nature" because "while [fintech] companies like Wealthfront have replaced
human money managers with algorithmic programs, they have simply substituted a
human intermediary with a computerized one"); Leslie Picker, "Fintech" Loses Some of Its
Attraction for Investors, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 6, 2016 (noting that "[e]ven industry leaders are
divided over what separates a fintech company from a plain old financial services
company that uses technology").
11. For a description of the long history of innovation in finance, see Brummer & Yadav,
supra note 4, at 13-25. They describe, among other things, the role that financial
innovation was seen to have played in the Great Depression, the Gramm Leach Bliley Act,
and the Dodd-Frank Act.
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risks for the economy. 12 These scholars have identified a set of related pathologies that
have been created or exacerbated by the ever-increasing size and power of large Wall
Street banks.1 3 Perhaps the most common critique in this line of scholarship is that of
the "too-big-to-fail" problem.14 Too-big-to-fail generally refers to the belief that large
banks have become so central to the health of the financial sector, and the economy
more generally, that no rational government could allow them to go bankrupt.15 This
situation alone might not be problematic if it were not for its downstream behavioral
effects on banks. Banks, aware of the implicit guarantee offered by national
governments, felt free to engage in excessively risky behavior - such as making risky
bets on the housing market and issuing complicated credit default swaps - a situation
that eventually led to the financial crisis. 16 But the problems of concentration in the
financial sector also created a set of other pathologies related to competition,
information and conflicts of interest in the financial markets. 17
Fintech, however, has largely defied this conventional understanding about the
direction of financial markets and institutions towards increasingly concentrated
12. See, e.g., Jeffrey N. Gordon & Christopher Muller, Confronting Financial Crisis: Dodd-
Frank's Dangers and the Case for a Systemic Emergency Insurance Fund, 28 YALE J. REG. 151,
154-55 (2011); Prasad Krishnamurthy, Regulating Capital, 4 HARV. Bus. L. REV. 1, 1 (2014);
Felix B. Chang, The Systemic Risk Paradox: Banks and Clearinghouses Under Regulation, 2014
COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 747, 747 (2014); Manuel Utset, Complex Financial Institutions and
Systemic Risk, 45 GA. L. REV. 779 (2011); Edward R. Morrison, Is The Bankruptcy Code an
Adequate Mechanism for Resolving the Distress of Systemically Important Institutions?, 82
TEMP. L. REV. 449 (2009); Kenneth Ayotte & David A. Steel, Jr., Bankruptcy or Bailouts, 35 J.
CORP. L. 469 (2010); Michael C. Munger & Richard M. Salsman, Is "Too Big to Fail" Too
Big?, 11 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 433 (2013); Arthur E. Wilmarth, The Dodd-Frank Act: A
Flawed and Inadequate Response to the Too-Big-To-Fail Problem, 89 OR. L. REV. 951 (2011);
David Zaring, A Lack of Resolution, 60 EMORY L.J. 97, 106 (2010).
13. See, e.g., Jonathan C. Lipson, Against Regulatory Displacement: An Institutional Analysis of
Financial Crises, 17 U. PA. J. Bus. L. 673 (2015); Tom C.W. Lin, The New Financial Industry,
65 ALA. L. REv. 567 (2014).
14. See ANDREW Ross SORKIN, Too BIG TO FAIL: THE INSIDE STORY OF How WALL STREET AND
WASHINGTON FOUGHT TO SAVE THE FINANCIAL SYSTEM- AND THEMSELVES (2010); Marcelo
Dabos, Too Big to Fail in the Banking Industry: A Survey, in Too BIG TO FAIL: POLICIES AND
PRACTICE IN GOVERNMENT BAILOUTS 141 (2004); John Crawford, Predicting Failure, 7 VA. L.
& Bus. REV. 171, 173 (2012); Zachary Gubler, Regulating in the Shadows: Systemic Moral
Hazard and the Problem of the Twenty-First Century Bank Run, 63 ALA. L. REV. 253 (2012).
15. See Steven L. Schwarcz, Systemic Risk, 97 GEO. L. J. 193 (2008); Hal S. Scott, The Reduction
of Systemic Risk in the United States Financial System, 33 HAv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 671, 673
(2010).
16. See John Crawford, The Moral Hazard Paradox of Financial Safety Nets, 25 CORNELL J.L. &
PUB. POL'Y 95, 95 (2015); Viral V. Acharya, Deniz Anginer & A. Joseph Warburton, The
End of Market Discipline? Investor Expectations of Implicit Government Guarantees, Working
Paper (May 1, 2016), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract id=1961656.
17. See Andrew F. Tuch, Financial Conglomerates and Information Barriers, 39 J. CORP. L. 563
(2014); Andrew F. Tuch, The Fiduciary Dilemma in Large-Scale Organizations: A Comparative
Analysis, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. Gov. & FIN. REG. (May 17, 2017),
https:/ /corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2017/05/17/the-fiduciary-dilemma-in-large-scale-
organizations-a-comparative-analysis/.
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markets.1 8  Fintech markets instead tend to be highly diffuse, spreading
decisionmaking and power among a number of small, disparate actors. These actors
have smaller sections of the market, focus on narrow industry areas, and often are
made up of a number of nimble start-ups. The actors may be small fintech firms,
individuals, or even computer servers. The diffusion of financial operations to a wide
number of actors has important implications for the way that finance functions, and in
many ways defies fundamental assumptions about financial markets. It also generates
different categories of risks and benefits.
One particularly stark example of the diffusion of power in fintech markets is
provided by the emergence of virtual currencies in recent years. Virtual currencies
like Bitcoin and Ethereum have grown at precipitous rates over the last few years, both
in terms of value and in their wider use, but their business model is based on the
radical concept that currency need not be issued and controlled by a single actor.
19
Bitcoin and ethereum currencies are not represented by physical bills or coins, and
they are not backed by the authority of national governments. 20 Instead, they are based
on blockchain technology that allows decentralized, peer-to-peer networks to register
and confirm transactions in the currencies.2' When an owner of Bitcoin transfers the
currency to another party, this transaction is recorded on a public ledger, known as
the blockchain.22 Other users continuously download this ledger and thereby
authenticate valid transactions. 23 The network of users forms a kind of distributed
decisionmaker, and it relies for its functioning on the consensus of the community.
24
The users that provide the computing power to process these transactions are granted
new currency as a reward for their contributions.25 And while the currency is entirely
"virtual," with no real-world counterparts, it can be used to purchase a wide variety
18. Brummer and Yadav describe a similar feature of fintech as the "disintermediating"
effects of financial innovation. See Brummer & Yadav, supra note 4, at 6. They note that
"[u]nlike earlier eras, where innovation was often driven by established incumbents,
fintech gives a leading role to often small, start-up names whose primary expertise can
sometimes reside in tech rather than in finance." Id. at 36. They also highlight how "in
part by virtue of being capable of precisely targeting components of the supply chain, the
rising cast of upstart firms and services need not always compete directly with all
incumbents." Id. at 37.
19. See Kevin V. Tu & Michael W. Meredith, Rethinking Virtual Currency Regulation in the
Bitcoin Age, 90 WASH. L. REv. 271 (2015); Carla L. Reyes, Moving Beyond Bitcoin to an
Endogenous Theory of Decentralized Ledger Technology Regulation: An Initial Proposal, 61 VILL.
L. REv. 191 (2016).
20. See EUR. CENT. BANK, VIRTUAL CURRENCY SCHEMES 5 (Oct. 2012),
http://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/other/virtualcurrencyschemes20l2lOen.pdf.
21. See Jesse Yli-Huumo, Deokyoon Ko, Sujin Choi, Sooyong Park & Kari Smolander, Where
Is Current Research on Blockchain Technology?-A Systematic Review, 10 PLoS ONE, e163477
(2016), http://journals.plos.org/plosone/article?id=10.1371/journal.pone.01 634 7 7.
22. See Reyes, supra note 12, at 198
23. See id. at 197-99.
24. See How Does Bitcoin Work?, THE ECONOMIST (Apr. 11, 2013),
https://www.economist.com/bitcoinexplained.
25. See PEDRO FRANcO, UNDERSTANDING BICOIN: CRYPrOGRAPHY, ENGINEERING, AND
ECONOMICS 101 (2015); Tu & Meredith, supra note 12, at 283.
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of goods and services, and a large number of virtual currency exchanges have sprung
up to facilitate these conversions. 26 Indeed, companies and individuals pay significant
amounts of natural money, whether it be dollars, euros, or yen, to buy the virtual
currencies. The value of Bitcoin has increased dramatically in recent months -the
price for a single Bitcoin rose from $963 on January 1, 2017 to an all-time high of $20,089
in December 2017, an increase of nearly 2000% in less than a year. The rise in Ethereum
has been even more staggering - the price of a single token of Ether rose from $7.98 on
January 1, 2017 to $1,432 on January 13, 2018, an increase of more than 17800%.27
While the cryptocurrency industry is a particularly pronounced example of the
phenomenon, diffusion is also typical of other fintech industries. Crowdfunding, for
example, takes advantage of mobile and online platforms to allow companies seeking
capital to access wide groups of investors. 28 Crowdfunding firms, while standing as
the intermediaries behind the platforms, tend to take a light hand in the process. 29 As
a result, companies (and, more and more, individuals) seeking equity investments or
loans can more or less directly tap willing markets.30 Kickstarter, an early pioneer in
the area, has emerged as a remarkably effective way for early stage companies to raise
money for new projects.31 It has developed a particular strength in the video game
industry and other creative projects. Peer-to-peer lending firms, on the other hand,
have specialized in connecting small businesses, startups, and individuals with large
groups of parties willing to lend them money.32 These firms, sometimes called
"crowdlending" platforms, essentially crowdsource lending decisions, with borrowers
submitting requests to a central database, and potential lenders reviewing the terms
26. See Nikolei M. Kaplanov, Nerdy Money: Bitcoin, the Private Digital Currency, and the Case
Against Its Regulation, 25 Loy. CONSUMER L. REv. 111, 116 (2012).
27. See WORLD COIN INDEX, BITCOIN AND ETHEREUM PRICE CHARTS,
https://www.worldcoinindex.com.
28. See Kathryn Judge, The Future of Direct Finance: The Diverging Paths of Peer-to-Peer Lending
and Kickstarter, 50 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 603 (2015); Donald C. Langevoort & Robert B.
Thompson, "Publicness" in Contemporary Securities Regulation After the JOBS Act, 101 GEO.
L.J. 337, 339 (2013); Joan MacLeod Heminway, Crowdfunding and the Public/Private Divide
in U.S. Securities Regulation, 83 U. CiN. L. REV. 477 (2014); C. Steven Bradford, Crowdfunding
and the Federal Securities Law, 2012 COLUM. Bus. L. REv. 1 (2012); Joan MacLeod Heminway,
Mhat is a Security in the Crowdfunding Era?, 7 OHIO ST. ENTREPRENEURIAL Bus. L.J. 335(2012); Joan MacLeod Heminway & Shelden Ryan Hoffman, Proceed at Your Peril:
Crowdfunding and the Securities Act of 1933, 78 TENN. L. REv. 879 (2011).
29. See Global Crowdfunding, THE ECONOMIST (Apr. 4, 2015),
https://www.economist.com/news/economic-and-financial-indicators/21647603-
global-crowdfunding.
30. See FIN. CONDUCT AUTH., A REVIEW OF THE REGULATORY REGIME FOR CROWDFUNDING AND
THE PROMOTION OF NON-READILY REALISABLE SECURITIES BY OTHER MEDIA 5 (2015);
Christine Hurt, Pricing Disintermediation: Crowdfunding and Online Auction IPOs, 2015 U.
ILL. L. REv. 217, 221 (2015).
31. See Need Some Reward Ideas? Here Are 96 of Them, KICKSTARTER (Apr. 16, 2015),
https://www.kickstarter.com/blog/need-some-reward-ideas-here-are-96_of-them.
32. See Judge, supra note 21, at 608-21; William S. Warren, The Frontiers of Peer-to-Peer Lending:
Thinking About a New Regulatory Approach, 14 DUKE L. & TECH. REv. 298 (2016); Zachary
Adams Mason, Online Loans Across State Lines: Protecting Peer-to-Peer Lending Through the
Exportation Doctrine, 105 GEO. L.J. 217 (2016).
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and rates and deciding whether to invest. While the platform firms perform some
substantive roles, including verifying the identity of borrowers and providing basic
background information about them, the actual lending decisions are made by large
groups of outside investors, who may be individuals, companies, or more
conventional banks.33 This outsourcing of risk to large numbers of dispersed actors
has contributed to a lowering of interest rates in a variety of markets, from auto loans
to student loans to home mortgages.34
Thus, fintech markets tend to defy conventional understandings about the
necessity of large, concentrated actors within finance. Most fintech companies are
themselves small and narrowly focused. What is more, they tend to outsource
decisionmaking to large numbers of other actors. By dispersing ever-growing aspects
of decisionmaking to large numbers of actors, fintech capitalizes on one of its greatest
advantages: its ability to connect widely dispersed groups for the purpose of
facilitating low cost transactions.
B. Automation
In addition to high levels of diffusion, the fintech sector is also typified by high
levels of automation. Fintech firms are heavily, indeed existentially, dependent on the
technological infrastructure that underlies their systems.35 This infrastructure is based
on advances in artificial intelligence B6 big data,37 machine learning, 38 and, more
33. See Judge, supra note 21, at 611.
34. See Robert Farrington, The Rise of Peer to Peer Student Loans, FORBES (Aug. 13, 2014),
https:/ /www.forbes.com/ sites/robertfarrington/2014/08/13/the-rise-of-peer-to-peer-
student-loans; Car Loans: New Engine, THE ECONOMIST (May 5, 2016),
https://www.economist.com/news/finance-and-economics/2169827 6-fintech-firms-
find-way-finance-purchases-secondhand-cars-new-engine; Ben McLannahan, Fintech
Start-Ups Look to Build on US Mortgage Market Share, FIN. TIMES (Nov. 24, 2016),
https://www.ft.com/content/e83f9a78-blbc-11e6-9c37-5 7 87 33 54 99 aO.
35. Brummer and Yadav argue that fintech is defined by the fact that "algorithms--or
programmed computerized instructions -form the operational basis for financial
products that exhibit high degrees of automation and artificial intelligence (Al) in their
workings." Brummer & Yadav, supra note 4, at 31. In addition, they argue that fintech is
defined by a separate trait: "a dependence on vast quantities of conventional as well as
novel types of data in the design of fintech products." Id. at 27. This section will discuss
both these features together, as they are in some ways inseparable. After all, the
algorithms that fintech companies tend to use are based primarily on data inputs, and the
data inputs are used primarily as a way of informing the algorithms. But it is important
to note that they could be separated to some extent, for example, in bitcoin's underlying
software.
36. SCOTT PATTERSON, DARK POOLS: HIGH-SPEED TRADERS, A.I. BANDITS, AND THE THREAT TO THE
GLOBAL FINANCIAL SYSTEM (2012).
37. VIKTOR MAYER-SCHONBERGER & KENNETH CUKIER, BIG DATA: A REVOLUTION THAT WILL
TRANSFORM How WE LIVE, WORK AND THINK (2013); Andrew McAfee & Erik Brynjolfsson,
Big Data: The Management Revolution, HARv. Bus. REv., Oct. 2012, at 60-68.
38. See Harry Surden, Machine Learning and Law, 89 WASH. L. REv. 87 (2014); Cary Coglianese
& David Lehr, Regulating by Robot: Administrative Decision Making in the Machine-Learning
Era, 105 GEO. L.J. 1146 (2017).
Vol 23:2168
Financial Regulation in the Bitcoin Era
generally, algorithmic decisionmaking. 39 In all of these areas, fintech firms employ
increasingly sophisticated mechanisms to allow financial transactions to be entered
into at high speed and with minimal or no human input.40
The delegation of decisionmaking to computers has, of course, affected nearly
every aspect of society today, and its consequences have been studied widely.41 Its
impact on finance can hardly be overstated. In recent years, advancements in
computer science, the sophistication of algorithms, the increasing online presence of
individuals, and the ever-expanding amounts of information open and available on
the internet have enabled a sea-change in the capabilities of computers to make real-
world decisions.42 These algorithms can in many ways outperform humans due to
their ability to process larger amounts of information in short time spans. 43 Fintech
firms, in turn, have premised their business models on extensive use of these
technologies.
Take, for example, the investment advisor industry. The asset management
industry has long prided itself on the importance and value of individualized and
personal advice.44 Brokers and investment advisers tout their ability to develop
relationships with clients and create tailored investment strategies to meet their needs.
But in recent years, a number of digital advisors have emerged that promise to
improve investment results and reduce costs, all without the need for any human
intervention at all. These "robo-advisors" deploy sophisticated algorithms to assess
an individual investor's risk profile, time horizon, and other characteristics to fashion
investment portfolios.45 Potential investors simply go to the robo-advisor's internet
site, fill out a simple questionnaire, and then can hand over control of their investments
39. See IRENE ALDRIDGE, HIGH-FREQUENcY TRADING: A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO ALGORITHMIC
STRATEGIES AND TRADING SYSTEMS (2010); Joshua A. Kroll et al., Accountable Algorithms, 165
U. PA. L. REV. 633 (2017); Erik F. Gerding, Code, Crash, and Open Source: The Outsourcing of
Financial Regulation to Risk Models and the Global Financial Crisis, 84 WASH. L. REV. 127, 130-
35 (2009); Lin, supra note 4, at 573-74;.
40. See Lin, supra note 4, at 573-74.
41. See John 0. McGinnis, Accelerating Al, 104 Nw. U.L. REV. 1253 (2010); David C. Vladeck,
Machines Without Principals: Liability Rules and Artificial Intelligence, 89 WASH. L. REV. 117,
121 (2014); Ryan Calo, Robotics and the Lessons of Cyberlaw, 103 CALIF. L. REV. 513 (2015);
Matthew U. Scherer, Regulating Artificial Intelligence Systems: Risks, Challenges,
Competencies, and Strategies, 29 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 353 (2016).
42. See Yesha Yadav, How Algorithmic Trading Undermines Efficiency in Capital Markets, 68
VAND. L. REV. 1607, 1617-31 (2015); SCOTT PATTERSON, DARK POOLS: THE RISE OF THE
MACHINE TRADERS AND THE RIGGING OF THE STOCK MARKET 322-35 (2013).
43. See Frank J. Fabozzi et al., High-Frequency Trading: Methodologies and Market Impact, 19 REV.
FUTURES MKTs. 7, 9-10 (2011).
44. See Harvey Bines, The Varieties of Investment Management Law, 21 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN.
L. 71 (2016); Ryan Sklar, Hedges or Thickets: Protecting Investors From Hedge Fund Mangers'
Conflicts of Interests, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 3251 (2009); Roberta S. Karmel, The Challenge of
Fiduciary Regulation: The Investment Advisers Act After Seventy-Five Years, 10 BROOK. J. CORP.
FIN. & COM. L. 405 (2016); Edward B. Rock, Foxes and Hen Houses? Personal Trading by
Mutual Fund Managers, 73 WASH. U. L. Q. 1601 (1995); Arthur B. Laby, Fiduciary Obligations
of Broker-Dealers and Investment Advisers, 55 VILL. L. REV. 701 (2010).
45. See Tom Baker & Benedict G.C. Dellaert, Regulating Robo Advice Across the Financial Services
Industry, 103 IOWA L. REV. (2018).
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to the robo-advisor's algorithm. The algorithm can send out buy and sell orders,
rebalance portfolios, and even respond to changing legal incentives, such as engaging
in "tax harvesting" to reduce the investor's income taxes. Sites such as Wealthfront
have seen enormous increases in the size of their assets under management. 46 These
companies argue that their algorithms provide higher quality advice, with fewer
conflicts, and with less chance for human error or emotion to skew investment
decisions. They can make decisions faster and more reliably than human advisors.
Blockchain similarly relies on automation for its functions. Virtual currencies
based on blockchain technology rely on distributed databases maintained by peer to
peer networks.47 Their core functioning is based on digital cryptography in order to
ensure that they are reliable and transparent. These codes record transactions on the
public ledger and allow networks of other computers to verify the validity of the
transactions. While transactions in Bitcoin and Ethereum are sometimes initiated by
individuals, they are increasingly handled by automated "bots" that facilitate the
smooth functioning of the network.48 Because there is no central administrator of the
blockchain, this ecosystem can sometimes struggle to deal with unintended, or even
illegal, uses of the technology. For example, in 2014, Mt. Gox, a Bitcoin exchange that
at one point dominated the industry, accounting for 70% of worldwide Bitcoin
transactions, collapsed when it was discovered that a hacker had exploited a software
bug in Bitcoin to steal 744,000 bitcoins, an amount that represented 6% of all Bitcoins
in circulation. 49
The increasing sophistication of algorithms in financial markets has also allowed
for the rise of a new field of investing, often referred to as "high frequency trading."5°
High frequency traders develop programs that automatically execute trades on the
basis of market information. 51 These trading strategies rely on speed and automation
to gain an advantage over their rivals. They can process information and make
investment decisions based on that information much faster than any human could
ever hope to do so -in some cases, the algorithms allow trading firms to purchase or
46. In the period from 2012 to 2017, Wealthfront increased its assets under management from
$700 million to $5 billion, an increase of 614%. See Andrew Meola, Wealthfront Review
2017: Fees, Returns, Investing Services & Competitors, Bus. INSIDER (Feb. 9, 2017),
http://www.businessinsider.com/wealthfront-review.
47. See discussion supra Part I.A.
48. See Kayla Matthews, The Role of Trading Bots in the Cryptocurrency Market, BiTcOIN MAG.
(Aug. 7, 2017), https://www.nasdaq.com/article/the-role-of-trading-bots-in-the-
cryptocurrency-market-cm828 288 .
49. See Robert McMillan, The Inside Story of Mt. Gox, Bitcoin's $460 Million Disaster, WIRED
(Mar. 3, 2014), https://www.wired.com/2014/03/bitcoin-exchange/.
50. See IOSCO TECHNICAL COMM., REGULATORY ISSUES RAISED BY THE IMPACT OF
TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGES ON MARKET INTEGRITY AND EFFICIENCY: CONSULTATION REPORT
10 (July 2011); Yesha Yadav, The Failure of Liability in Modern Markets, 102 VA. L. REV. 1031
(2016); Jeffrey MacIntosh, High Frequency Traders: Angels or Devils? 3-5 (C.D. Howe Inst.
Comment. No. 391, 2013).
51. See Yadav, supra note 34, at 1622-31 (describing the rise of high-frequency trading and the
strategies that high-frequency traders use).
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sell securities in a matter of microseconds. 52 JP Morgan even reported that its newly-
developed algorithms could analyze 12,000 commercial loan contracts in seconds, a
task that it estimated would take lawyers and loan officers 360,000 hours to do.5 3 High
frequency trading has had dramatic effects on the functioning of securities markets,
speeding up the process of information diffusion and market adjustment. 54 It has also,
more worrisomely, been blamed for creating or worsening market crashes, due to its
reliance on pre-programmed algorithms that do not adjust to reflect unexpected
market changes. 55
The automation that underlies fintech contributes to market diffusion. Because
the core functions of fintech firms are performed, not by humans, but by computers,
algorithms, or networks, fintech firms do not need the scale and size that other
financial institutions benefit from. Their business models are not premised on the
same economies of scale that more traditional financial institutions do, and they do
not need large, diversified employee bases. Instead, automation allows fintech firms
to stay small and concentrate on narrow, targeted sectors of the financial industry.56
Similarly, the diffuse nature of fintech markets encourages firms to automate ever
greater portions of their services, integrating algorithms deeper into their businesses.
Thus, fintech's diffusion and automation tend to complement and reinforce one
another in important ways.
C. Adaptation
Finally, the fintech industry is also typified by high levels of adaptation.
Adaptation, in this case, refers to the tendency of markets to change in response to
external circumstances. 57 These changes may be as simple as shifting a company's
target market or advertising strategy, or as fundamental as changing the structure of
the business itself. Some changes are spurred by a recognition of flaws or failures in
previous markets, while others are spurred by innovations that create entirely new
markets. Regardless of the area, however, fintech markets have demonstrated a
remarkable ability to adapt and change in light of new information. This adaptation
52. See Brummer & Yadav, supra note 4, at 33 ("Algorithms are programed to make real-time,
trade-by-trade determinations about what to buy and sell -in increments measured in
milliseconds and microseconds.").
53. See Machine Learning Promises to Shake Up Large Swathes of Finance, THE ECONOMIST (May
25, 2017), https://www.economist.com/news/finance-and-economics/21722685-fields-
trading-credit-assessment-fraud-prevention-machine-learning.
54. See Yadav, supra note 43, at 1612.
55. See STAFFS OF THE CFTC & SEC, FINDINGS REGARDING THE EvENTs OF MAY 6,2010 45 (2010),
http://www.sec.gov/news/ studies/2010/marketevents-report.pdf.
56. See William Magnuson, Regulating Fintech, 71 VAND. L. REv. (forthcoming 2018).
57. See Raymond E. Miles, Charles C. Snow, Alan D. Meyer & Henry J. Coleman,
Organizational Strategy, Structure, and Process, 3 ACAD. MAN. REV. 546 (1978); Daryl 0.
McKee, P. Rajan Varadarajan & William M. Pride, Strategic Adaptability and Firm
Performance: A Market-Contingent Perspective, 53 J. MKTG. 21 (1989); Bryan A. Lukas,
Strategic Type, Market Orientation, and the Balance Between Adaptability and Adaptation, 45 J.
Bus. RES. 147 (1999).
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has proven essential in the growth and spread of fintech into ever greater sectors of
the financial industry, even while leading to high levels of volatility in several sectors.
Perhaps the best example of this adaptability comes from the world of virtual
currency. The cryptocurrency market is remarkably segmented. Bitcoin, the most
well-known virtual currency, had an aggregate value of nearly $45 billion in August
2017, but its success has led to criticisms of what some actors view as a flaw in the
underlying programming: Bitcoin transactions can only be processed at a rate of seven
transactions per second.5 8 Believing that this problem would inhibit the currency's
growth, a group of miners argued that the Bitcoin structure should be altered to
increase the size of Bitcoin blocks and thus speed up transactions. 59 When other
members of the community refused to approve the change, the Bitcoin network split
into two versions, in a process known as a "fork." 6° As a result, Bitcoin suddenly
adapted into two versions: one, the traditional one, with the same limits on the speed
of the transaction, and another, named BitcoinCash, with additional flexibility on the
size and speed of transactions. 61 This adaptation occurred swiftly-the time from the
announcement of the fork to the completion of the fork was just a week -and
efficiently - it required no new factories, equipment, or employees, just the consent of
a sufficiently large group of miners.
But the adaptability of the cryptocurrency market is also evidenced by the
remarkable spread of new forms of virtual currency based on alterations in blockchain
technology. For example, the cryptocurrency Ethereum is based on the same basic
blockchain programming as Bitcoin, but its creators inserted additional features aimed
to make the currency better suited to be used as a basis for virtual contract, also known
as "smart contracts." 62 These smart contracts utilize Ethereum technology to create a
set of automated commands that serve to enforce contractual obligations, forcing
parties to abide by the terms of their agreements. 63 The capabilities of Ethereum have
proven useful to banks seeking to monitor their financial contracts, and in 2017, a
consortium of banks including Microsoft and JP Morgan Chase, reached an agreement
to create a computing system based on Ethereum. 64 When concerns arose about the
lack of confidentiality in Bitcoin, a group of programmers launched yet another virtual
currency, ZCash, promising complete anonymity for all transactions and
58. See Daniela Sonderegger, A Regulatory and Economic Perplexity: Bitcoin Needs Just a Bit of
Regulation, 47 WASH. U. J.L. & PoL'Y 175, 186 n.88 (2015).
59. See Paul Vigna, Bitcoin's Sectarian Battles Heat Up, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 25, 2017),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/bitcoins-sectarian-battles-heat-up-1508 9 64 607.
60. See Nathaniel Popper, Some Bitcoin Backers Are Defecting to Create a Rival Currency, N.Y.
TimES (July 25, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/25/business/dealbook/bitcoin-cash-split.html.
61. Id.
62. See Paul Vigna, Bitcoin Rival Ethereum Gains Traction, WALL ST. J. (June 20, 2016),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/bitcoin-rival-ether-gains-traction-1466 4 6 1279 .
63. See Reyes, supra note 12, at 200.
64. See Nathaniel Popper, Business Giants to Announce Creation of a Computing System Based on
Ethereum, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 27, 2017),
https:/ /www.nytimes.com/ 2017/02/27/business/ dealbook/ethereum-alliance-
business-banking-security.html.
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participants. 65 Each of these variations of currency has received significant interest
from consumers, and the speed at which they emerge in response to changing demand
or new information would be unimaginable among national currencies. The
introduction of the Euro in 1999, for example, to foster greater integration among
members of the European Union, required decades of negotiations and planning. 66
Similarly, the crowdlending industry has demonstrated a remarkable degree of
adaptation in the face of new opportunities. The crowdlending sector was created on
the basis of advancements in peer-to-peer technology. 67 These advancements made it
easier and more convenient for individuals to transact over online platforms. 68 At the
same time, with the spread of smartphones and internet commerce, consumers became
more comfortable with the idea of buying and selling goods and services without ever
seeing their counterparties. 69  Out of this confluence of factors, a number of
crowdlending companies arose to facilitate consumer loans: peer-to-peer lending
platforms such as Prosper began connecting small borrowers with individuals willing
to lend money. 70 When these companies met with great success, the market quickly
shifted to other sectors of the credit markets that were seen as faulty or malfunctioning.
SoFi, for example, was formed in 2011 to focus on the student loan market, and initially
it focused on connecting wealthy alumni from particular universities with current
students at those universities that needed to fund their education.71 Similarly, another
set of peer-to-peer lending platforms, such as Funding Circle, were created to focus on
small business loans, a sector of the market that traditional banks retreated from in the
wake of the financial crisis. 72 In response to changing market conditions, including the
risk tolerance of banks, crowdlending platforms have managed to transform the credit
industry, lowering interest rates for borrowers, expanding access to credit to wider
audiences, and giving investors diversified opportunities to invest their capital. The
65. See Digital Money: Known Unknown, THE ECONOMIST (Oct. 27, 2016),
https://www.economist.com/news/finance-and-economics/21709329-another-crypto-
currency-born-known-unknown; Nathaniel Popper, Zcash, a Harder to Trace Virtual
Currency, Generates Price Frenzy, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 31, 2016),
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/01/business/dealbook/zcash-a-harder-to-trace-
virtual-currency-generates-price-frenzy.html.
66. See Jens Danman, Paradise Lost: Can the European Union Expel Countries from the Eurobond?,
49 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 693 (2016).
67. See Elaine Moore & Tracy Alloway, Peer-to-Peer Lending: The Wisdom of Crowds, FIN. TIMES(May 19, 2014), https://www.ft.com/content/94eb60e6-df23-11e3-a4cf-00144feabdc0.
68. See Christine Hurt, Pricing Disintermediation: Crowdfunding and Online Auction IPOs, 2015
U. ILL. L. REV. 217, 221 (2015).
69. See id.
70. See Liz Moyer, From Wall Street Banking, A New Wave of Fintech Investors, N.Y. TIMES (Apr.
6, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/04/07/business/dealbook/from-wall-street-
banking-a-new-wave-of-fintech-investors.html.
71. See Peter Rudegeair & Telis Demos, Slump Might Turn Anti-Bank SoFi Into a Bank, WALL
ST. J. (July 12, 2016), https://www.wsj.com/articles/slump-might-turn-anti-bank-sofi-
into-a-bank-1468339004.
72. See Crowdfunding: Cool, Man, THE ECONOMIST (May 9, 2015),
https://www.economist.com/news/special-report/21650291-where-small-businesses-
can-borrow-if-banks-turn-them-down-cool-man.
Spring 2018
Stanford Journal of Law, Business & Finance
landscape of the crowdlending industry has shifted quickly, as entrepreneurs
identified opportunities in new sectors and new strategies.
The ability of fintech markets to adapt and change in response to market demand
gives fintech an advantage over more traditional financial institutions, which, for a
number of reasons, tend to be slow to change their basic business models and
assumptions. Fintech companies are small and nimble, and the price of entering new
markets is low. They, thus, do not need to achieve the same extensive knowledge of
the industry that financial intermediaries typically require. And because they do not
have massive numbers of employees running their operations -the average virtual
currency company in North America has just 12 employees 73 - they can easily
communicate new strategies and business models without the need for costly
transition periods, or the hiring of consulting firms.
But it is also important to note that the high level of adaptation found in fintech
does not necessarily correspond with high levels of stability. In other words, the fact
that the industry itself is highly adaptive does not mean that particular companies in
the industry are especially resilient. If anything, the opposite appears to be true-
fintech companies are notoriously volatile. The average life of a Bitcoin exchange is a
mere 381 days.74 Crowdlending platforms are similarly unstable. One study found
that, in China, where there are approximately 3,900 crowdlending companies, over
1,200 had run into some form of major distress, ranging from frozen funds to complete
cessation of operations.75 An incredible 266 of those companies had CEOs that had
fled the authorities, under accusations of fraud, corruption, and other crimes.
76 As will
be described further below, this volatility should not be surprising, as the very
adaptability of fintech contributes to its rapid change and upheaval.
Finally, the high levels of adaptation in fintech industries strengthen, and are in
turned strengthened by, fintech's other core features, its diffusion and its automation.
The fact that fintech markets are dominated by small companies makes it easier for
these markets to change- there are no dominant actors that can prevent market shifts
that challenge their competitive position. Similarly, the fact that fintech industries are
heavily automated makes it easier for these industries to expand or modify their
businesses-the barriers to entry for new markets are lower when a company's
underlying technology applies just as well to, say, auto loans as it does to mortgages.
Conversely, the speed of adaptation and change in fintech has encouraged companies
to stay small. Decisionmakers, after all, naturally hesitate to invest in large
infrastructure projects or hire large numbers of employees when the demand for those
projects or employees can swiftly disappear. And the speed at which fintech industries
change and evolve puts ever greater weight on a company's ability to stay at the
73. GARRICK HILEMAN & MICHAEL RAucHs, CAMBRIDGE CTR. FOR ALT. FIN., GLOBAL
CRYPTOCURRENCY BENCHMARKING STUDY 25 (2017).
74. See Tyler Moore & Nicolas Christin, Beware the Middleman: Empirical Analysis of Bitcoin-
Exchange Risk, 7859 FIN. CRYPTOGRAPHY & DATA SECURITY 25 (2013).
75. See China's P2P Lending Boom: Taking Flight, THE ECONOMIsT (Jan. 23, 2016),
https://www.economist.com/news/finance-and-economics/21688940-allure-and-peril-
chinese-fintech-companies-taking-flight.
76. Id.
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forefront of innovation in programming and automation.
II. Fintech's Regulatory Challenge
The rise of fintech in the recent decade has brought great change to the financial
services industry. Where traditional financial markets were dominated by a small
number of large actors, fintech markets are dominated by a large number of small ones.
These markets are heavily dependent on automation and algorithmic decisionmaking
for their proper functioning. And they tend to exhibit high rates of adaptation,
constantly shifting and transforming in response to external information. These
changes have the potential to provide significant benefits for the economy. They
reduce the cost of transacting in finance, from raising capital to investing capital to
spending capital. They reduce the risk of monopolistic behavior and abuses of
dominant positions. And they expand access to the financial system to sectors that
have traditionally been underserved or underbanked.
At the same time, fintech's structure raises a set of concerns about whether current
legal regimes adequately guide and constrain financial markets. 77 These concerns can
be usefully understood as related to the three core purposes of financial regulation:
efficiency, fairness, and stability. 78 First, fintech may reduce the financial sector's
ability to efficiently allocate capital. Second, fintech may create greater opportunities
for actors to take advantage of unsophisticated consumers. Third, fintech may create
a set of systemic risks that threaten to affect the broader economy. Each of these
concerns is at the core of modern day financial regulation. Without a better
understanding of how fintech threatens these goals, policymakers will struggle to
fashion rules that appropriately address the unique risks of the industry.
A. Efficient Allocation of Capital
One of the core functions of the financial sector is to allocate resources towards
their most efficient uses. 79 Those who possess capital are not always capable of
77. See Brummer & Yadav, supra note 4, at 39 (arguing that market integrity is threatened by
the fact that "the design of fintech products and services -anchored by vast troves of big
data-introduces steep informational uncertainties for regulators"); Rory Van Loo,
Making Innovation More Competitive: The Case of Fintech, 65 UCLA L. REv. 232 (2018)(arguing that the structure of competition law has hindered innovations in financial
technology); Yadav, supra note 42, at 1666 (arguing that "[i]f achieving allocative
efficiency remains the goal of regulatory policy, then its realization may be growing more
difficult in algorithmic markets").
78. This characterization of the three overarching goals of financial regulation is not accepted
by all. For example, Brummer and Yadav, in their article Fintech and the Innovation
Trilemma, argue that fintech exacerbates tensions between three different goals: financial
innovation, rules simplicity, and market integrity. Brummer & Yadav, supra note 4, at 39-
44. As will be described further below, these categories in some ways overlap with the
categories the Article identifies as central to financial regulation, and differ in other ways.
Most importantly, innovation, in our view, is most appropriately considered as a
component of efficiency, and rules simplicity covers a wide variety of goals, from
efficiency to fairness to stability. In any case, these categories are fuzzy and interrelated.
79. See EUGENE F. FAMA & MERTON H. MILLER, THE THEORY OF FINANCE 3-15 (1972); Joseph E.
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deploying that capital well, and those that are capable of deploying capital do not
always have the capital necessary to do so. Banks and other financial institutions fill
this void, intermediating between capital owners and capital users. Thus, finance at
its core is a method for ensuring that capital is allocated efficiently.80 Banks take
deposits from savers, and they then loan those deposits out to borrowers who need
the money - perhaps for the purchase of equipment for a farm, or the launch of a new
store for a small business. The decision about where capital is allocated is essential to
the proper functioning of the broader economy.
81
But financial markets do not always - or even ever - allocate capital optimally.
They may, for example, overvalue companies that operate in trendy or fashionable
sectors.8 2 Conversely, they may undervalue small companies that do not have
widespread media coverage. 83 They may discount the likelihood of events with low
probabilities, and they may overweight the importance of events with high
probabilities.84 The root cause of these inefficiencies varies depending on the case, but
it is often connected to market failures (such as the presence of monopolies) or
behavioral irregularities (such as overconfidence bias) in the industry.
85
Fintech's great promise is that it reduces or eliminates many of the inefficiencies
present in traditional financial markets. By eliminating costly intermediaries and
reducing transaction costs, fintech allows financial participants to engage in a greater
variety of transactions with fewer delays. By spreading market power among a larger
number of smaller actors, fintech reduces concerns about harmful monopolistic
behaviors. By automating decisionmaking, fintech minimizes the potential for
Stiglitz, The Allocation Role of the Stock Market: Pareto Optimality and Competition, 36 J. FIN.
235, 235 (1981); Eugene F. Fama, Efficient Capital Markets: A Review of Theory and Empirical
Work, 25 J. FIN. 383, 383 (1970). According to Brummer and Yadav, one key regulatory
objective of financial regulation is to ensure market integrity by "combatting fraud, and
making sure that investors and consumers of financial services are protected from unfair
and illegal acts that could deprive them of money, rights or both." Brunmer & Yadav,
supra note 4, at 8. This Article takes a slightly different approach, separating out the
efficiency-oriented goals of financial regulation from the consumer-protection-oriented
goals of financial regulation. While it is certainly plausible to argue that both efficiency
and fairness are most usefully analyzed as the single concept of "market integrity," the
Article separates the two in order to demonstrate the very different, and sometimes
conflicting, problems encountered in reducing transaction costs and protecting
consumers.
80. See JOHN ARMOUR, DAN AWREY, PAUL DAVIES, LuCA ENRIQUES, JEFFREY N. GORDON, COLIN
MAYER & JENNIFER PAYNE, PRINCIPLES OF FINANCIAL REGULATION 22-51 (2015).
81. Id. at 26.
82. See JASON ZWEIG, YOUR MONEY AND YOUR BRAIN: How THE NEW SCIENCE OF
NEUROECONOMICS CAN HELP MAKE You RICH 8 (2008), (noting that "[d]uring 1998 and
1999, one group of stocks outperformed the rest of the technology industry by a scorching
63 percentage points- merely by changing their corporate names to include .com, .net, or
internet").
83. Mark Rubinstein, Rational Markets: Yes or No? The Affirmative Case, 57 FIN. ANALYSTS J. 15,
23-26 (May-June 2001).
84. See NICHOLAS NAsSIM TALEB, THE BLACK SWAN: THE IMPACT OF THE HIGHLY IMPROBABLE
(2007).
85. See Stiglitz, supra note 79, at 387.
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cognitive biases to skew financial decisions. All of these features suggest that fintech
will lead to greater efficiency in the financial sector.
But while the nature of fintech reduces a sub-set of efficiency-related concerns in
the financial industry, it also exacerbates another sub-set of concerns. It is only natural,
of course, that different markets will create different risks. But in the case of fintech,
these concerns are particularly pronounced, and are likely to become only more so as
fintech expands.
First, the disaggregation and diffusion of fintech markets increase the likelihood
that public goods will be underprovided in the industry. It is perhaps counterintuitive
that an increase in the number of actors in a market can reduce efficiency in the
market -it is, after all, a commonplace that competition increases as the number of
competitors increases. 86 But the large number of actors in fintech creates a different
problem related, not to competition, but rather to cooperation. Diffuse markets are
more likely to suffer from public goods problems. 87 Public goods, of course, refer to
that category of goods that are non-rivalrous and non-excludible, in the sense that any
one actor's consumption of the good does not reduce the ability of other actors to
consume the good and no actor can be prevented from utilizing the good.88 The
paradigmatic examples of such goods are the environment and the national military -
once these goods exist, everyone benefits from them.But public goods also exist in the
financial industry. For example, the production of "best practices" guidelines related
to cybersecurity or the dissemination of knowledge about how to promote a sound
banking system both constitute public goods that may benefit society more generally. 89
The problem with public goods is that private markets tend to produce them at
suboptimal rates.90 These problems can sometimes be overcome in concentrated
markets, where the actors are known to each other and can observe (and potentially
sanction) the behavior of the others.91 But in diffuse markets, where actors are
dispersed and have few interactions with each other, the likelihood that collective
86. See, e.g., Louis Kaplow, Market Share Thresholds: On the Conflation of Empirical Assessments
and Legal Policy Judgments, 7 J. COMP. L. & ECON. 243 (2011) (describing the use of market
share thresholds for the determination of whether antitrust rules have been violated);
William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Market Power in Antitrust Cases, 94 HARv. L. REV.
937, 937 (1981); David T. Scheffman & Mary Coleman, Quantitative Analyses of Potential
Competitive Effects from a Merger, 12 GEO. MASON L. REV. 319 (2004) (discussing the
theoretical basis for numerical analyses of market share for competition levels).
87. See, e.g., MANCUR OLSON, JR., THE Locic OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIc GOODS AND THE
THEORY OF GROUPS (1965); ELINOR OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS: THE EVOLUTION OF
INSTITUTIONS FOR COLLECTIVE ACTION (1990) (describing the ways in which small groups
resolve collective action problems that trouble larger groups); Elinor Ostrom, Collective
Action and the Evolution of Social Norms, 14 J. ECON. PERSP. 137 (2000); Oliver Kim & Mark
Walker, The Free Rider Problem: Experimental Evidence, 43 PuB. CHOICE 3 (1984).
88. See Olson, supra note 77, at 132-34.
89. See Richard K. Gordon, On the Use and Abuse of Standards for Law: Global Governance and
Offshore Financial Centers, 88 N.C. L. Rev. 501, 508 (2010); Elaine M. Sedenberg & Deirdre
K. Mulligan, Public Health as a Model for Cybersecurity Information Sharing, 30 BERKELEY
TECH. L.J. 1687 (2015).
90. See Olson, supra note 77, at 132-34.
91. See id.; Ostrom, supra note 77, at 149.
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action problems can be overcome decreases exponentially. 92 Fintech, of course,
demonstrates all the traits of a diffuse market, and thus the likelihood that fintech
actors will voluntarily produce public good-type resources is significantly lower than
one would expect in traditional, more concentrated financial sectors.93
Second, fintech's reliance on automation and algorithmic decisionmaking may
reduce efficiency in financial markets. Again, this point may seem counterintuitive: if
we can have computers make decisions faster and more reliably than humans, one
might expect that efficiency would increase in financial markets. But this may not
always hold true in fintech. In particular, the delegation of decisionmaking to pre-
programmed algorithms creates the possibility of "model risk."94 Even the most
sophisticated trading algorithms rely on simplified assumptions about the nature of
markets and individuals. When these assumptions are proved wrong, or errors are
made in the programs, the speed and automaticity of algorithmic decisionmaking
makes the consequences potentially more harmful. In 2012, one high-frequency trader,
the Knight Capital Group, lost $440 million in just 45 minutes due to the failure of a
technician to include new code in one of the firm's servers.95 Several studies have
shown that the rise of high-frequency algorithmic trading has led to increases in
volatility in stock markets.96 One study identified 18,520 "ultrafast extreme events" in
financial markets from the years 2006-2011, and found a close correlation between the
proliferation of such events and system-wide financial collapse.97 Automation also
may reduce allocative efficiency by increasing herd behavior. 98 This may occur in
several different ways, but perhaps the simplest involves computer programs sharing
certain programming templates. If an algorithm proves successful in the market, other
actors may be tempted to simply copy or replicate the algorithm. If they do, then the
inaccuracies and flawed assumption of a single model may be propagated throughout
the system, thereby significantly increasing the chance of financial contagion or other
inefficient behaviors. 99
92. See id. at 132-34.
93. Id.
94. See Yadav, supra note 34, at 1647-52.
95. See id. at 1623 n.51, citing Nathaniel Popper, Knight Capital Says Trading Glitch Cost It $440
Million, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 2, 2012), https://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/08/02/knight-
capital-says-trading-mishap-cost-it-440-million/.
96. See, e.g., Neil Johnson et al., Abrupt Rise of Machine Ecology Beyond Human Response Time,
NATURE Sci. REP. (Sept. 11, 2013), http://www.nature.com/articles/srep0 26 2 7; Frank
Zhang, High-Frequency Trading, Stock Volatility, and Price Discovery (Dec. 2010)
(unpublished manuscript), http://ssm.com/abstract=1691679.
97. See Neil Johnson et al.,_supra note 86.
98. See David Scharfstein & Jeremy Stein, Herd Behavior and Investment, 80 AMER. ECON. REV.
465 (1990); Marcel Kahan & Michael Klausner, Path Dependence in Corporate Contracting:
Increasing Returns, Herd Behavior and Cognitive Biases, 74 WASH. U. L. REV. 347, 356 (1996).
99. For a discussion of such model risks, see Toshiyasu Kato & Toshinao Yoshiba, Model Risk
and its Control, 18 MONETARY & ECON. STUD. 129 (2000) (Herd behavior risk is only
exacerbated when the particular action, while beneficial when taken by a single actor,
becomes harmful when taken by large numbers of actors. The rise of index investing, a
staple of robo-advising companies, may prove to be one such phenomenon. The strategy
Vol 23:2
Financial Regulation in the Bitcoin Era
Finally, the speed of adaptation and change in fintech may also have negative
effects on the efficient allocation of capital. With new fintech companies and
innovations arising or disappearing seemingly every day, the problem of asymmetric
information between market participants becomes severe. 100 Asymmetric information
generally refers to the imbalance of information between insiders, who have direct
access to information about the benefits and risks of particular products or industries,
and outsiders, who lack such information. 101 Asymmetric information can lead to
market failure if insiders are able to extract rent from outsiders or, alternatively, if
outsiders refrain from entering into the market at all.1 02 In either case, the result is an
inefficient market. 03 Information asymmetries tend to erode over time, however, as
information about the market and its participants eventually spreads to broader
audiences. 1°4 But because fintech has a tendency to adapt and change so quickly,
outsiders often do not have sufficient time to resolve information asymmetry
problems. Cryptocurrencies, and in particular the rise of "initial coin offerings,"
provide a good example of this problem. 105 New cryptocurrency is built on different
underlying infrastructure, different programming, and different decisionmaking
procedures. Outsiders that are considering investing in initial coin offerings thus must
of passively investing in a broad index of the market as a whole, rather than actively
choosing stocks that are expected to outperform the market, has grown steadily more
popular in recent years, with passive mutual funds and exchange traded funds increasing
their share of S&P 500 companies from 4.6% to 11.6% in the period from 2005 to 2016).
See Tom McGinty, Sarah Krouse & Elliot Bentley, Index Funds Are Taking Over the S&P 500,
WALL ST. J. (Oct. 17, 2016), http://www.wsj.com/graphics/index-funds-taking-over-sp-
500/. A number of studies have concluded that the passive strategy, on average,
outperforms active stock management, at least partially because it costs less. But the rise
of index investing also raises concerns about whether stocks will continue to respond to
market signals. In other words, if all investors adopt an index approach, then all stocks
would be purchased by all buyers. It would not matter if a company had a bad earnings
report or just launched a new drug -if the company is part of the index, the investor is
obligated to own it. Some companies have more than 30% of their stock owned by passive
funds, with one company, Meredith Corp. having an incredible 39.7% of its shares
controlled by such funds. See Chris Dieterich & Corrie Driebusch, Wall Street's Newest
Puzzle: What Passive Buying and Selling Means for Individual Stocks, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 21,
2017), https://www.wsj.com/articles/wall-streets-newest-puzzle-what-passive-buying-
and-selling-means-for-individual-stocks-1505986202. Thus, while index investing as a
strategy functions on an individual investor level, it may lead to dysfunctions in markets
if it is adopted more widely.
100. See Joseph Stiglitz, The Contributions of the Economics of Information to Twentieth Century
Economics, 115 Q.J. ECON. 1441 (2000); Pierre Barbaroux, From Market Failures to Market
Opportunities: Managing Innovation Under Asymmetric Information, 3 J. INNOVATION &
ENTREPRENEURSHIP, 5 (2015).
101. See id. at 1441.
102. See George Akerlof, The Market for "Lemons": Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism,
84 Q.J. ECON. 488 (1970).
103. See Stiglitz, supra note 90, at 1445.
104. See Barbaroux, supra note 90.
105. For the Securities Exchange Commission's opinion on initial coin offerings, see SEC. ExCH.
COMM'N., INVESTOR BULLETIN: INITIAL CoIN OFFERINGS (2017),
https://www.sec.gov/oiea/investor-alerts-and-bulletins/ib coinofferings.
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learn of the currency, attempt to understand its fundamental risk-reward structure,
and then decide whether to invest in it. This process is extraordinarily complex and
difficult, and investors may well resort to heuristics, rather than reasoned analysis, in
order to resolve it.106 Even if outsiders manage to overcome the information
asymmetry problem, the process itself is costly: each new venture or innovation
requires outsiders to devote time and resources to the learning process. 10 7 The learning
benefits that come from well-established markets with repeated interactions and
observed behaviors are thus noticeably absent in many fintech markets.
For all these reasons, fintech raises a set of concerns about the efficient allocation
of capital through financial markets. Fintech may lead to markets that underproduce
social goods such as best practices on cybersecurity or sound banking procedures. It
may lead to more volatile markets that fail to respond appropriately to new
information. And it may lead to markets in which informational asymmetries impede
informed bargaining. These concerns suggest that regulation will need to adjust to
improve the efficiency of fintech markets.
B. Consumer Protection
In addition to efficiency, financial regulation is also concerned with ensuring
fairness in financial markets.1°8 Financial reform efforts have often been driven by a
belief that consumers or investors require greater protections than are available in a
purely deregulated environment. The perceived abuses and frauds perpetrated in the
1920s, for example, led to the introduction of the Securities Act and the Securities
Exchange Act, which increased the disclosure and reliability of securities issued to the
public.1°9 The corporate and accounting scandals of the early 2000s led to the
106. On the difficulties of assessing the value of initial coin offerings, the New York Times
recently offered the following assessment: "Imagine that a friend is building a casino and
asks you to invest. In exchange, you get chips that can be used at the casino's tables once
it's finished. Now imagine that the value of the chips isn't fixed, and will instead fluctuate
depending on the popularity of the casino, the number of other gamblers and the
regulatory environment for casinos. Oh, and instead of a friend, imagine it's a stranger
on the internet who might be using a fake name, who might not actually know how to
build a casino, and whom you probably can't sue for fraud if he steals your money and
uses it to buy a Porsche instead. That's an I.C.O." Kevin Rose, Is There a Cryptocurrency
Bubble?, N.Y. TIvES (Sept. 15, 2017),
https:/ /www.nytimes.com/2017/09/15/business/ cryptocurrency-bubble-doge.html.
107. See Akerlof, supra note 102, at 489.
108. Brummer and Yadav describe a similar concept when they argue that a key objective of
financial regulation is "market integrity." Brummer & Yadav, supra note 4, at 8.
According to Brummer and Yadav, financial regulators act as "cops on the block"
ensuring that "consumers of financial services are protected from unfair and illegal acts
that could deprive them of money, rights or both." Id. They also include under the
umbrella of market integrity the prevention of fraud and the promotion of financial
stability. Id. at 8-9. This Article separates these concepts out into three different, but inter-
related goals. See also Oren Bar-Gill & Elizabeth Warren, Making Credit Safer, 157 U. PA.
L. REV. 1, 6 (2008) (arguing that "for a growing number of families that are steered into
overpriced and misleading credit products... credit products benefit only the lenders").
109. See RALPH F. DE BEDTS, THE NEW DEAL'S SEC 1-85 (1964); JOSEPH P. LASH, DEALERS AND
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enactment of the Sarbanes Oxley Act, which required greater internal reporting and
audit obligations for companies listed on the stock exchange.110 And perceived abuses
in the mortgage and credit industries in the late 2000s led to the creation of the
Consumer Finance Protection Bureau in 2011.111 In each of these instances, legislators
have sought to protect investors and consumers in financial transactions from being
treated in ways that violate a fundamental sense of fairness, even when these
transactions may be entered into willingly.
It is unsurprising that fintech raises a number of consumer protection concerns.
Innovation always raises questions about how old law applies to new circumstances.
Lawmakers can never foresee the infinite variety of ways in which companies and
individuals can act, and the very structure of law can shape the way that businesses
develop. Many of the consumer protection concerns surrounding fintech are also
present in more traditional financial services industries, but are only heightened in the
fintech context. Others are entirely unique to the fintech industry. This Part will
highlight the key categories of consumer protection risk in fintech and identify the
ways in which these risks are heightened in fintech industries.
First and foremost, fintech presents important privacy concerns for consumers.
Fintech firms, after all, often rely on consumers providing them with access to
significant amounts of sensitive personal and financial information.11 2 Personal
finance companies like Mint, for example, request that users grant them access to view
their bank account and retirement account information. 1 3 Online payment companies
require authorization to transfer money from one account to another. 14 Traditional
banks have raised concerns about granting computers access to personal accounts, but
they have been rebuked by the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau for limiting
precisely this sort of access. 115 At the same time, more and more fintech firms are
DREAMERS: A NEw LOOK AT THE NEW DEAL 137-71 (1988); FERDINAND PECORA, WALL
STREET UNDER OATH (1968); James M. Landis, The Legislative History of the Securities Act of
1933, 28 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 29 (1959).
110. See Roberta Romano, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Making of Quack Corporate Governance,
114 YALE L.J. 1521 (2005).
111. See Leonard J. Kennedy, Patricia A. McCoy & Ethan Bernstein, The Consumer Financial
Protection Bureau: Financial Regulation for the Twenty-First Century, 97 CORNELL L. REv. 1141
(2012).
112. See Dina Moussa, Protecting Payment Privacy: Reconciling Financial Technology and the
Fourth Amendment, 1 GEO. L. TECH. REv. 339 (2017).
113. See Nathaniel Popper, Banks and Tech Firms Battle Over Something Akin to Gold: Your Data,
N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 23, 2017),
https:/ /www.nytimes.com/2017/03/23/business/ dealbook/banks-and-tech-firnis-
battle-over-something-akin-to-gold-your-data.html.
114. Id.
115. In the European Union, regulators have gone even further in demanding that traditional
banks open themselves up to competition from fintech firms. In 2018, the EU's new
Payment Services Directive went into effect, requiring banks to cooperate with fintech
firms seeking access to customer account data and payment services. See Europe's Banks
Face a Glut of New Rules, THE ECONOMIST (Nov. 30, 2017),
https://www.economist.com/news/finance-and-economics/21731824-ten-years-after-
financial-crisis-regulatory-revolution-continues-europes.
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gaining access to broad and deep information about individuals and their financial
and personal lives. As more firms have access to, and control over, such information,
the risk of public exposure through hacking or otherwise increases.11 6 While
consumers (in some cases) turn over this information willingly, they may well not fully
understand the vulnerabilities of the firms to which they are turning it over. This will
put further pressure on cybersecurity and privacy law to fulfill their mandate of
protecting confidential information from disclosure or improper use.
Second, one of fintech's greatest advantages-its speed and ease of use-also
creates concerns about whether consumers will enter into financially significant
transactions on an uninformed basis. Fintech firms pride themselves on how
convenient and easy it is to access their services: Sindeo, a San-Francisco based firm
that specializes in home mortgages, promises on its website that prospective
homeowners can "shop more than one thousand loans in just 5 minutes." 117 But the
elimination of the barriers that have long stood between consumers and complicated
financial products may have the less desirable effect of causing significant financial
decisions to be made on the basis of snap judgments.118 One need only consider the
irrational exuberance surrounding recent initial coin offerings, described above, to
understand the scope of the problem. 119 Similarly, fintech reduces the capacity for
intermediaries, such as banks and brokers, to fulfill their gatekeeping function in
financial markets. In the crowdlending industry, for example, borrowers are directly
connected with lenders, and banks often play little or no role in the process. While this
structure may reduce costs, it also eliminates the ability of banks to serve as
gatekeepers and block bad actors from entering the market.12° While banks certainly
do not always fulfill this function perfectly, they are generally viewed as having a
116. See Michael Murphy & John Barton, From a Sea of Data to Actionable Insights: Big Data and
What It Means for Lawyers, 26 INTELL. PROP. & TECH. L.J. 8, 12-13 (2014); Sasha Romanosky
et al., Empirical Analysis of Data Breach Litigation, 11 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 74, 74-75
(2014).
117. Sindeo.com, accessed October 1, 2017; see also Lisa Prevost, One-Stop Borrowing on the Web,
N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 27, 2015.
118. See DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING, FAST AND SLOW 105 (2011); Amos Tversky & Daniel
Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases, 185 Sci. 1124 (1974)
(describing the various biases that affect decision-making under conditions of
uncertainty); Daniel Kahneman & Shane Frederick, Representativeness Revisited: Attribute
Substitution in Intuitive Judgment, in HEUMsTIcS AND BIASEs 49 (Thomas Gilovich et al. eds.,
2002).
119. See The Market in Initial Coin Offerings Risks Becoming a Bubble, THE ECONOMIST (Apr. 27,
2017), https://www.economist.com/news/finance-and-economics/ 2 17 214 25 -it-may-
also-spawn-valuable-innovations-market-initial-coin-offerings.
120. For a description of the gatekeeping role of financial intermediaries, see Elisabeth de
Fontenay, Private Equity Firms as Gatekeepers, 33 REv. BANKING & FIN. L. 115 (2013); Stephen
Choi, Market Lessons for Gatekeepers, 92 Nw. U.L. REV. 916, 918 (1998); Reinier H.
Kraakman, Gatekeepers: The Anatomy of a Third-Party Enforcement Strategy, 2 J.L. ECON. &
ORG. 53, 54 (1986); John C. Coffee, Jr., Gatekeeper Failure and Reform: The Challenge of
Fashioning Relevant Reforms, 84 B.U. L. REV. 301, 309 (2004); Andrew F. Tuch, Multiple
Gatekeepers, 96 VA. L. REV. 1583 (2010).
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reputational interest in preventing abusive or unfair products from being marketed. 121
The removal of intermediaries from financial services, one of the professed goals of
many fintech firms, thus may serve to reduce the quality of financial services on the
market.
Third, fintech's widespread use of anonymous online transactions likely attracts
greater levels of crime and fraud to the sector. Anonymity, in this case, does not refer
solely to the formal anonymity granted by some virtual currencies. It also covers other
financial services that can be purchased and sold through online portals without the
intervention of humans. Robo-advisors, for example, typically never meet their
customers and channel all interactions through their online sites. 122 Crowdfunding
platforms allow businesses and individuals to raise money without ever meeting their
investors, or, for that matter, the platform itself.123 But surely one of the more worrying
developments in fintech has been the use of virtual currencies as the medium of choice
for criminals. In the "Wannacry" ransomware attack that affected hundreds of
thousands of computers worldwide in 2017, hackers managed to freeze access for
computer owners to their computers, and, in order to unfreeze it, users had to send a
certain amount of bitcoin, typically around $300, to a specific bitcoin account.124
Adding to the difficulty of tracking the ransom money, the hackers are suspected to
have converted the bitcoin into another virtual currency, Monero, which is widely
believed to be even more secure and anonymous than bitcoin. 125 Similarly, bitcoin was
the currency of choice for The Silk Road, a dark web online site that was notorious for
trafficking in drugs.126 If fintech allows criminals and fraudsters to evade national
regulations, it could well cause significant harm to consumers.
Finally, fintech's use of "big data" strategies may lead to hidden discrimination,
intentional or not, within the financial services industry.127 While computers are not
subject to the errors and biases of humans, they are only as effective as the algorithms
121. See de Fontenay, supra note 110, at 119.
122. See, Can Robo Advisors Replace Human Financial Advisors, WALL ST. J., (Feb. 28, 2016),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/can-robo-advisers-replace-human-financial-advisers-
1456715553.
123. See Dale A. Oesterle, Intermediaries in Internet Offerings: The Future Is Here, 50 WAKE FOREST
L. REV. 533 (2015).
124. See Nicole Perlroth, Mark Scott & Sheera Frenkel, Cyberattack Hits Ukraine Then Spreads
Internationally, N.Y. TIMEs (June 27, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/27/ technology/ransomware-hackers.html.
125. See Ryan Browne, Hackers Have Cashed Out on $143,000 of Bitcoin from the Massive
WannaCry Ransomware Attack, CNBC (Aug. 3, 2017),
https:/ /www.cnbc.com/2017/08/03/hackers-have-cashed-out-on-143000-of-bitcoin-
from-the-massive-wannacry-ransomware-attack.htn-l; Sean Gallagher, Researchers Say
WannaCry Operator Moved Bitcoins to "Untraceable" Monero, ARS TECHNICA (Aug. 4, 2017),
https:/ / arstechnica.com/ gadgets/ 2017/ 08/researchers-say-wannacry-operator-moved-
bitcoins-to-untraceable-monero/.
126. See Ben Tarnoff, The Dark Web's Dark Prince, WALL ST. J. (June 12, 2017),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-dark-webs-dark-prince-1497307220.
127. See Salon Barocas & Andrew D. Selbst, Big Data's Disparate Impact, 104 CAL. L. REV. 671(2016). For a broader discussion of the use by fintech companies of big data strategies,
see Brummer & Yadav, supra note 4, at 28-31.
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that underlie their outputs. 128 To the extent that those algorithms incorporate inputs
that either explicitly discriminate between users on the basis of protected traits or are
closely correlated with those traits, they may lead to pernicious bias and
discrimination, and in ways that are more difficult to discover.129 One could imagine,
for example, that "big data" analytics could conclude that residents of certain zip codes
were better, or worse, credit risks, and thus assign them better or worse interest rates
based on that information. If these zip codes were closely correlated with race, or
religion, or national origin, then the increasing use of such algorithms could lead to
problematic discriminatory effects. And the presence of such correlations might well
themselves only reflect past discrimination, leading to a self-justifying furtherance of
biased means and ends in finance. Even determining whether such discrimination was
occurring would be difficult, given the complexity of big data analytics tools.
In sun, the rise of fintech presents a set of troubling concerns about consumer
protection. It may lead to heightened privacy concerns, as more personal and financial
information is stored by an increasing proliferation of companies. It may lead to
unsophisticated investors making uninformed, but deeply impactful, financial
decisions based on spur-of-the-moment judgments. It may increase the prevalence of
crime and fraud within the financial sector. And it may cause certain vulnerable
groups to face hidden bias and discrimination in financial transactions. These are the
sorts of problems that financial regulation has long sought to stamp out, and their
presence in the fintech sector is troubling.
C. Systemic Risk
In addition to efficiency and fairness, financial regulation also aims to promote
stability.130 Indeed, this aspect of financial regulation is one of the distinguishing
features of banking law. To a greater degree than perhaps any other area of law, the
law governing financial institutions focuses on preventing, not just harm to other
parties, but instability within the industry itself. The reason is a simple one: the
128. See EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, BIG DATA: SEIZING OPPORTUNITIES, PRESERVING VALUES
(May 1, 2014),
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/big-data-privacy-report_5.1.14
final-print.pdf
129. See Michael Schrage, Big Data's Dangerous New Era of Discrimination, HARV. Bus. REV., Jan.
29, 2014; Cynthia Dwork & Deirdre K. Mulligan, It's Not Privacy, and It's Not Fair, 66 STAN.
L. REV. ONLINE 35 (2013); Joseph W. Jerome, Buying and Selling Privacy: Big Data's Different
Burdens and Benefits, 66 STAN. REV. ONLINE 47 (2013); Kate Crawford & Jason Schultz, Big
Data and Due Process: Toward a Framework to Redress Predictive Privacy Harms, 55 B.C. L.
Rev. 93 (2014); Max N. Helveston, Consumer Protection in the Age of Big Data, 93 Wash. U.
L. Rev. 859 (2016).
130. Brummer and Yadav argue that stability is a component, along with the prevention of
fraud and the protection of consumers, of a broader concept: market integrity. Brummer
& Yadav, supra note 4, at 8. This Article agrees that financial stability is related in
important ways with market integrity, and also with efficiency, but it has separated out
this goal from the others in order to highlight the special issues and considerations that
animate financial stability rules. It is at least possible to imagine that an efficient market
could be an unstable one, in the sense that prices quickly move to reflect changing
circumstances in the world.
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financial sector is so central to the functioning of modem economies that when it
struggles, the effects ripple out broadly to the broader society. 131 Thus, economic
growth depends heavily on the health and stability of the financial sector.132
Financial regulation has sought to promote stability in the financial sector by
adopting several mechanisms aimed at increasing the resilience and robustness of
banks. For example, banks must maintain certain capital to asset ratios to ensure that,
in the event of an adverse change in the market, they can absorb losses and avoid
catastrophic consequences. 133 Similarly, banks must contribute funds to the Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation so that depositors can remain confident that their
deposits will be protected from loss.134 The ex post justification for these rules is that,
in times of market turmoil, banks and consumers will be protected from loss. But the
ex ante justification is that the very existence of the rules renders it less likely that the
losses will occur in the first place. After all, if market participants are aware that banks
have large reserves in place to be able to withstand losses, they will be more likely to
continue to do business with them on ordinary terms, thus preventing further losses.
Similarly, if depositors are aware that their accounts at banks are insured against loss,
they will be less likely to withdraw their deposits in times of market turmoil, thus
preventing the kind of runs that banks experienced during the Great Depression.
Since the financial crisis, financial regulators have focused their attentions on
resolving the systemic risks presented by large, "too big to fail" banks.135 This
regulatory response was driven by the belief that banks in the pre-crisis period had
exploited the implicit governmental guarantee on their activities to engage in
excessively risky behavior. Knowing that their failure would impose catastrophically
large costs on broader society, and that any rational government would be forced to
bail them out to avoid these costs from materializing, banks had incentives to take
risky bets on mortgages and create ever more complex derivatives that would create
short-term profits at the risk of long-term losses. The failure of Lehman Brothers in
2009 provided a powerful example of the threat that "too big to fail" banks posed to
131. See Alan Binder, It's Broke, Let's Fix It: Rethinking Financial Regulation, 6 INT'L J. CENT.
BANKING 277, 279-80 (2010).
132. See JOHN ARMOUR, DAN AWREY, PAUL DAVIES, LuCA ENRIQUEs, JEFFREY N. GORDON, COLIN
MAYER & JENNIFER PAYNE, PRINCIPLES OF FINANCIAL REGULATION, 51-52 (2015).
133. See John C. Coffee, Jr., Systemic Risk After Dodd-Frank: Contingent Capital and the Need for
Regulatory Strategies Beyond Oversight, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 795 (2011); Hal S. Scott, Reducing
Systemic Risk Through Reform of Capital Regulation, 13 J. INT'L ECON. L. 763 (2010).
134. ARMOUR ET AL., supra note 132, at 316- 40.
135. See Gordon & Muller, Confronting Financial Crisis: Dodd-Frank's Dangers and the Case for a
Systemic Emergency Insurance Fund, 28 YALE J. REG. 151, 154-55 (2011); Prasad
Krishnamurthy, Regulating Capital, 4 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 1, 1 (2014); Felix B. Chang, The
Systemic Risk Paradox: Banks and Clearinghouses Under Regulation, 2014 COLUM. BUs. L. REV.
747, 747 (2014); Manuel Utset, Complex Financial Institutions and Systemic Risk, 45 GA. L.
REV. 779 (2011); Kenneth Ayotte & David A. Steel, Jr., Bankruptcy or Bailouts, 35 J. CORP. L.
469 (2010); Michael C. Munger & Richard M. Salsman, Is "Too Big to Fail" Too Big?, 11 GEO.
J.L. & P B. POL'Y 433 (2013); Arthur E. Wilmarth, The Dodd-Frank Act: A Flawed and
Inadequate Response to the Too-Big-To-Fail Problem, 89 OR. L. REV. 951 (2011); David Zaring,
A Lack of Resolution, 60 EMORY L.J. 97, 106 (2010); Andrew F. Tuch, Financial Conglomerates
and Information Barriers, 39 J. CORP. L. 563 (2014).
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the wider economy.136 In order to resolve this problem, legislators enacted the Dodd-
Frank Act, which imposed a set of onerous requirements on "systemically important
financial institutions" and established new governmental entities aimed at monitoring
the large banks and their risk exposures.
137
From the perspective of size, fintech firms assuredly do not present the same risks
as more traditional Wall Street firms. They are significantly smaller on any number of
dimensions, from employment, 138 to assets, 139 to profits.14° No fintech firm (at least
presently) would fall under the umbrella of regulation aimed at "systemically
important financial institutions." Thus, fintech largely evades systemic-risk related
regulatory scrutiny.
This is problematic because fintech firms present a number of concerns related to
systemic risk.1 41 First, because of their small size, fintech actors are much more
vulnerable to rapid, adverse shocks.142 Even relatively small losses, from the
perspective of Wall Street investment banks, would sink many fintech firms. And
while the magnitude of the harm from the failure of a single fintech actor is smaller
than a comparable failure at a large Wall Street bank, the probability of its occurrence
136. Of course, the very fact that Lehman Brothers was allowed to fail suggests that the "too
big to fail" moniker is not entirely accurate. It does not, however, refute the possibility
that banking executives believed that their banks would not be allowed to fail.
137. See Hilary J. Allen, Putting the "Financial Stability" in Financial Stability Oversight Council,
76 OHIO ST. L.J. 1087,1113-20 (2015).
138. See GARRICK HILEMAN & MICHAEL RAUCHs, GLOBAL CRYPTOCURRENcY BENCHMARKING
STUDY 25 (2017) (noting that virtual currency companies in the United States have an
average of only 12 employees).
139. One of the larger robo-advisors, Wealthfront, had $5.5 billion in assets under
management as of March 2017. See Tom Anderson, Man vs. Machine: How to Figure
Out if You Should Use a Robo-Advisor, CNBC (Mar. 13,2016), https://www.cnbc.com/20
17/03/13/man-vs-mache-how-to-figure-out-if-you-should-use-a-robo-advisor.html.
Vanguard, on the other hand, had approximately $4 trillion in assets under management
as of December 31, 2016. See VANGUARD, FAST FACTS ABOUT VANGUARD,
https://about.vanguard.com/who-we-are/fast-facts/.
140. Prosper, for example, a prominent small business lending company based in San
Francisco, has yet to turn a profit. See Oscar Williams-Grut, Funding Circle CEO Says It's
a "Golden Age" For Marketplace Lending as Revenue Jumps 144%, Bus. INSIDER (Oct. 1, 2016),
https://www.businessinsider.com.au/funding-circle-ceo-samir-desai-on-lending-club-
2015-accounts-and-us-business-2016-9.
141. See generally Magnuson, supra note 56 (describing the systemic risk of fintech
innovations); Kathryn Judge, Investor Driven Financial Innovation, 7 HARv. Bus. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2018) (describing the ways in which investor-driven financial innovation
can increase fragility within markets).
142. While the size of fintech firms varies by industry, a few statistics may be illuminating
here. When Mt. Gox, the largest Bitcoin exchange in the world at the time, went under, it
had a mere three dozen employees. See PAUL VIGNA & MICHAEL J. CASEY, THE AGE OF
CRYPTOCURRENCY: How BrCOIN AND THE BLOCKCHAIN ARE CHALLENGING THE GLOBAL
ECONOMIC ORDER 268 (2016). Kickstarter, a major crowdfunding firm, has only 124
employees. See KICKSTARTER, MEET THE TEAM, available at www.kickstarter.com/team.
By comparison, Wells Fargo, a traditional bank, has approximately 269,000 employees.
See STATISTA, WELLS FARGO EMPLOYEES, available at
https://www.statista.com/statistics/295496/wells-fargo-full-time-employees/.
Vol 23:2186
Spring 2018 Financial Regulation in the Bitcoin Era 187
is significantly higher. A recent study of Bitcoin exchanges, for example, found that
new exchanges have an expected lifespan of just 381 days.143 Systemic risk refers to the
likelihood that losses in one part of the economy will cause larger, system-wide losses
in other parts of the economy. 44 It is created by the interaction between the magnitude
of a loss, the probability of its occurrence, and the likelihood that the loss will spread
to other parts of the financial sector.145 Thus, while fintech companies may have lower
loss magnitudes, these could be offset by higher loss probabilities. 146 As fintech
becomes more closely integrated into our financial system, and pathways for
contagion multiply, systemic risk concerns will only grow.
Second, because of the large number of actors in fintech markets, regulators
struggle to monitor the behavior of relevant participants. Regulatory regimes are only
effective if regulators can identify, observe, and sanction actors within the given
sphere of activity. 147 Unlike traditional finance, in which a few concentrated actors
control a significant portion of the market, fintech is typified by the proliferation of
many small actors. This poses an obstacle for regulators that must identify the
particular firms and individuals of interest to them. Even if regulators are capable of
identifying the relevant actors within a given fintech sector, they also must grapple
with the related problem of understanding the risks generated by those actors, many
of whom rely heavily on algorithms and computer coding for their decisionmaking. 14
These are difficult tasks even for those who specialize in the industry, let alone for
regulators who are often ill-equipped and under-resourced. 149 Without an appropriate
level of oversight and monitoring by capable regulators, fintech companies will be
more likely to engage in risky behavior and yet avoid detection.
Third, the characteristics of fintech companies create an environment in which
cooperative behaviors and norms are less likely to develop. 150 Even competitive
143. See Tyler Moore & Nicolas Christin, Beware the Middleman: Empirical Analysis of Bitcoin-
Exchange Risk, 7859 FIN. CRYPTOGRAPHY & DATA SECURITY 25 (2013).
144. See Adam J. Levitin, In Defense of Bailouts, 99 GEO. L.J. 435, 444-45 (2011); Steven L.
Schwarcz, Systemic Risk, 97 GEO. L.J. 193, 197 (2008).
145. See, e.g., NASSIM NICHOLAS TALEB, ANTFRAGILE: THINGS THAT GAIN FROM DISORDER 20-21(2012); Timothy Geithner, Are We Safe Yet? How to Manage Financial Crises, 96 FOREIGN AFF.
54 (2013); Markus K. Brunnermeier & Martin Oehmke, Bubbles, Financial Crises, and
Systemic Risk, in 2B HANDBOOK OF THE ECONOMICS OF FINANCE 1221, 1233-38 (George M.
Constantinides, Milton Harris & Rene M. Stulz eds., 2013); Graciela Kaminsky, Carmen
Reinhardt & Carlos Vegh, The Unholy Trinity of Financial Contagion, 15 J. ECON. PERSP. 51(2003); Lawrence H. White, Antifragile Banking and Monetary Systems, 33 CATOJ. 471 (2013);
Olivier de Bandt & Philipp Hartmann, Systemic Risk: A Survey 10-18 (Eur. Ctr. Bank,
Working Paper No. 35 2000).
146. See Magnuson, supra note 56, at 135-36.
147. See Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. POL. ECON. 169, 172-
73 (1968); George J. Stigler, The Optimum Enforcement of Laws, 78 J. POL. ECON. 526 (1970);
A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, Enforcement Costs and the Optimal Magnitude and
Probability of Fines, 35 J.L. & ECON. 133, 135-39 (1992).
148. See Magnuson, supra note 56, at 37.
149. See Lawrence G. Baxter, Capture Nuances in Financial Regulation, 47 WAKE FOREST L. REv.
537, 560-61 (2012).
150. See Magnuson, supra note 56, at 38-44.
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markets such as finance and asset management often end up displaying surprising
amounts of cooperation: actors may work together to create "best practices" or share
information about security vulnerabilities or, in particularly dire circumstances, to
ensure the survival of the market itself. 151 Large institutions such as Wall Street banks
interact with regulators and one another frequently, and thus have strong incentives
to maintain their reputation as cooperative partners. 52 Fintech firms, on the other
hand, have fewer opportunities for such interaction, and often have shorter time
horizons.153 As a result, they will perceive fewer benefits from contributing to the
production of wider social goods, such as the promotion of industry guidelines on risk
management or cybersecurity.
For all of these reasons, fintech firms present a set of systemic risk concerns that
are distinct from the concerns that are generated by more traditional financial
institutions. These risks are derived from fintech's disaggregated model of finance, its
heavy reliance on automation, and its high levels of adaptation and change. The risks
are only likely to grow as the various technologies gain greater acceptance and are
increasingly incorporated into the wider economy. And to the extent that current
financial regulations aimed at limiting systemic risk focus primarily on the risks of
large institutions, these regulations may be misguided.
III. Towards A Law of Fintech
The regulatory problems created by fintech call for a wider reassessment of
financial regulation in the Bitcoin era. This Section will argue that fintech is sufficiently
distinct from traditional financial institutions that it calls for tailored regulation that is
substantively different from general financial law. The goals of such a "law of fintech"
would naturally be similar to the goals of all financial regulation: promoting the
efficient allocation of capital, protecting consumers and investors, and increasing
stability and systemic resilience. But the methods for arriving at these goals, and thus
the focus and target of regulation, will look significantly different.'5 In particular,
fintech regulation should be guided by three overriding principles. First, it should
focus on improving the quality and quantity of information that is available with
respect to fintech products and services. Second, it should emphasize the centrality of
151. See Saul Levmore, Competition and Cooperation, 97 MIcH. L. REv. 216 (1999).
152. See William D. Cohen, Three Days That Shook The World, FORTUNE (Dec.
16, 2008), http://archive.fortune.com/2008/12/12/magazines/fortume/3days 1.fortun
e/index.htm.
153. See supra Part I.A.
154. Brummer and Yadav provide a useful survey of some of the more prevalent regulatory
approaches towards fintech. Brummer & Yadav, supra note 4, at 44-56. These responses
range from informal guidance to fintech licenses to regulatory "sandboxes." Id. They
argue that these strategies should not be viewed as "binary choices between high and low
levels of regulation," but rather as "a range of approaches that enable varying forms of
control, experimentation and guidance." Id. at 44. This Article agrees with that
characterization and would go further: many governments have provided conflicting
evidence of their intentions regarding the relative strictness of their financial rules'
application to fintech.
Vol 23:2
Spring 2018 Financial Regulation in the Bitcoin Era 189
cybersecurity for all fintech firms, and it should aim to exclude actors and industries
that fail to adopt appropriate safeguards. Third, it should simplify and centralize
regulatory authority over fintech in order to better allow regulatory authorities to
balance priorities and goals.
A. Information-Forcing Rules
Asymmetric information has long been recognized as a central cause of market
failure.155 In industries in which insiders have significantly more information about a
product and its risks than outsiders, voluntary market transactions may lead to
inefficient results, either because the insiders take advantage of the outsiders, or
because the outsiders refuse to do business at all. 156 One way to correct for these
problems is for insiders to voluntarily provide better information to outsiders: home
sellers, for example, could hire an independent inspection firm to confirm that houses
do not have any hidden defects; or, in the financial industry, financial firms could hire
ratings agencies to inspect their financial products for adequacy and reliability.1 57 But
such voluntary actions are both costly and potentially faulty, as the independence of
such outside inspectors may themselves be suspect.1 58 Thus, information asymmetries
are problematic for markets and market-based mechanisms and often call for
regulatory intervention to force better information production.
As mentioned above, fintech suffers from particularly acute information
asymmetries. The disaggregated nature of fintech, and the growth in the variety and
number of actors in the industry, places investors and consumers at a disadvantage
when attempting to gauge the reputation and reliability of particular actors. For
example, in the crowdfunding industry, investors must decide on whether to invest in
particular companies based primarily on information voluntarily provided by the
companies themselves. In traditional finance, investment banks or other financial
institutions would normally be expected to perform a significant amount of due
diligence for the companies that they were working for. In other words, they act as
"gatekeepers" ensuring that investors have some measure of certainty about the
reputation of their counterparties. 159 But crowdfunding platforms perform such
155. See ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICs 41-42 (6th ed. 2016); ROBERT L.
GLICKSMAN & RICHARD E. LEVY, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: AGENCY ACTION IN LEGAL CONTEXT
15-19 (2010).
156. See William W. Bratton & Michael L. Wachter, The Case Against Shareholder Empowerment,
158 U. PA. L. REV. 653, 696-705 (2010); Manuel A. Utset, Complex Financial Institutions and
Systemic Risk, 45 GA. L. REV. 779, 803-09 (2011); Kathryn Judge, Fragmentation Nodes: A
Study in Financial Innovation, Complexity, and Systemic Risk, 64 STAN. L. REV. 657, 696-97(2012); Gary Gorton & Lixin Huang, Bank Panics and Their Endogeneity of Central Banking,
53 J. MONETARY ECON. 1613 (2006).
157. See COOTER & ULEN, supra note 140, at 42.
158. See Kia Dennis, The Ratings Game: Explaining Rating Agency Failures in the Build Up to the
Financial Crisis, 63 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1111 (2009).
159. For a description of the gatekeeping function of financial intermediaries, see Reinier H.
Kraakman, Gatekeepers: The Anatomy of a Third-Party Enforcement Strategy, 2 J.L. ECON. &
ORG. 53, 54 (1986); John C. Coffee, Jr., Gatekeeper Failure and Reform: The Challenge of
Fashioning Relevant Reforms, 84 B.U. L. REV. 301, 309 (2004); Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier H.
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gatekeeping functions only reluctantly, and sometimes not at all. It is not uncommon
for such websites to include in their terms and conditions a "disclaimer of warranties"
that explicitly provides that the platform does not guarantee the accuracy, adequacy,
or usefulness of any content on the site. Fintech's widespread elimination of
gatekeepers creates a situation ripe for information problems.
1 60
And importantly, the significant information asymmetries in fintech lie at the root
of many of our concerns about the industry. From the perspective of efficiency,
information asymmetries within fintech have the potential to lead to a breakdown in
markets, causing an increase in the number and size of inefficient transactions, a
decrease in the number and size of efficient transactions, or both. The increased
transaction costs associated with information-scarce markets acts as a drag on the
efficient allocation of capital. From the perspective of fairness, the information
asymmetries within fintech markets can be expected to lead to a higher frequency of
consumer or investor fraud, as well as more mundane, but potentially more
problematic, irrational behavior on the part of these actors. Without comprehensive
and reliable information about the costs and benefits of particular fintech services,
consumers may be taken advantage of by unscrupulous businesses that promise them
above-market returns.161 They may also be more likely to engage in herd behavior that
leads them to contribute to asset bubbles that are divorced from the asset's intrinsic
value.1 62 Finally, from the perspective of stability, information asymmetries within the
fintech industry increase the possibility that fintech will create systemic risk for the
wider economy.1 63 Without better information about the structure and functioning of
fintech markets, regulators will struggle to monitor and constrain fintech services with
respect to broader system risks.16" Similarly, consumers that lack information about
the resilience and solvency of actors are more likely to be susceptible to panicked
behavior and contagion in the event of adverse market shocks.
165
It is unlikely that, in the absence of regulatory pressure, private market
mechanisms will lead to the appropriate level of information disclosure in fintech.
Because fintech tends to connect parties through disintermediated platforms, many of
the participants in the industry are unsophisticated. Such participants will likely be
unaware of the appropriate level of information that they should receive with respect
to financial transactions and thus cannot realistically be expected to press for it. And
the ease with which consumers can enter into fintech transactions - one can purchase
Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency, 70 VA. L. REV. 549, 618 (1984); Stephen
Choi, Market Lessons for Gatekeepers, 92 Nw. U. L. REv. 916, 918 (1998); Elisabeth de
Fontenay, Private Equity Firms as Gatekeepers, 33 REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 115, 121-24 (2013).
160. See Choi, supra note 144, at 934-39.
161. See David Z. Morris, The Rise of Cryptocurrency Ponzi Schemes, THE ATL. (May 31, 2017),
https:/ /www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2017/05/cryptocu-rrency-ponzi-
schemes/528624/.
162. See Rose, supra, note 96.
163. See Magnuson, supra note 56, at 10.
164. See Kathleen Judge, Information Gaps and Shadow Banking, 103 VA. L. REV. 411 (2017).
165. See Steven Schwarcz, Identifying and Managing Systemic Risk: An Assessment of Our
Progress, 1 HARV. Bus. L. REv. 94 (2011).
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tokens in an initial coin offering in a matter of minutes entirely through the internet -
discourages wider-ranging negotiation through which information might be
disclosed. Even sophisticated investors may not succeed in pressuring market
participants to provide fulsome disclosures about transaction risks. Sophisticated
investors, after all, have limited time and capacity to review and process the terms of
complex financial instruments. During the financial crisis, large banks - some of the
most sophisticated actors in the industry -found that their exposures to the home
mortgage crisis and related derivatives were substantially larger than their models had
predicted. And to the extent that the growth of fintech markets is driven by demand
among unsophisticated investors, sophisticated investors may have little leverage to
negotiate for better terms.
For these reasons, any financial regulation aiming to improve the functioning of
fintech markets needs to focus on resolving the significant information asymmetries
that exist within fintech.166  This will require regulators to drive information
production, ensuring that industry participants provide comprehensive, accurate and
consistent disclosures about their business models, functions, and risks, and that they
provide this information in easily digestible and accessible formats. The disclosures
should be directed and tailored to two general audiences: first, to the regulators
themselves, in order to improve their ability to monitor risks as they emerge; and
second, to consumers and investors, in order to improve their ability to make informed
decisions in the market.167
While a full discussion of the specific disclosure requirements for fintech firms is
beyond the scope of this article, and would certainly vary depending on the type of
company and industry at issue, a few simple guidelines should apply across fintech
sectors. First, fintech companies must be held responsible for the accuracy and
reliability of the information on their sites. While this would seem to be a relatively
uncontroversial and common-sense proposal, it would in fact signal a marked change
from the approach of many firms in the fintech industry. Both robo-advisors and
crowdfunding platforms, for example, often disclaim any warranty for the accuracy or
appropriateness of the information on their sites. Thus, a first step in reducing
information asymmetries in fintech would be to require fintech firms to be liable for
inaccuracies or misinformation they provide about their services.
Just as important as holding fintech firms responsible for the information they
provide is forcing the firms to provide the information in the first place. Regulators
must ensure that fintech firms provide comprehensive information about their services
and businesses prior to entering the market. Without such a requirement, the
imposition of liability for inaccurate disclosures might paradoxically cause fintech
firms to reduce the total amount of information they disclose, the precise opposite of
the desired result. At a minimum, the substantive disclosure obligations should
include basic information such as quantitative and qualitative discussion of the
166. See Donald C. Langevoort, Toward More Effective Risk Disclosure for Technology-Enhanced
Investing, 75 WAsH. U. L.Q. 753 (1997); Troy S. Brown, Legal Political Moral Hazard: Does the
Dodd-Frank Act End Too Big to Fail?, 3 ALA. C.R. & C.L. L. REV. 1, 37-46 (2012).
167. See Mary Jo White, Opening Remarks at the Fintech Forum, Nov. 14, 2016,
https://www.sec.gov/news/statement/white-opening-remarks-fintech-forum.html.
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business, past performance, and risk factors. To the extent that regulators require
access to sensitive information that might harm the company if disclosed to the public,
fintech firms should be allowed to divulge sensitive information solely to their
relevant regulator under a confidential disclosure process.
An essential question in any disclosure regime, of course, is the capacity of the
audience to process and understand the information that is eventually disclosed.
168
Fintech presents particularly thorny receptivity problems. For example, if a virtual
currency's code is publicly available, is this sufficient information for regulators and
consumers to be able to understand the risks of the currency? Or if a crowdlending
platform states in its terms and conditions that it relies on a particular type of
technology to model credit risks, is such a disclosure likely to be understood or even
read by most investors? The existence of such problems suggests that fintech
disclosures will require a significant amount of "translation" work aimed at making
the disclosures readily accessible and easily understood by the desired audiences. This
may well require regulators to create fintech-focused divisions that have the
operational and technical expertise to assess fintech risks. One model for such bodies
is the recently created cyber division of the Securities Exchange Commission, which
focuses on identifying and sanctioning "cyber-related misconduct."
169
Perhaps the greatest benefit of information-forcing rules is that they impose
relatively low burdens on fintech companies themselves. The majority of the
information that would need to be disclosed under plausible disclosure regimes
should be readily available to the relevant actors and thus will require minimal
additional research on the part of firms.170 The low cost of information production has
the additional advantage of avoiding inadvertent incentives for firms to engage in
regulatory arbitrage. Recent reforms of financial regulation have been sharply
criticized for their tendency to escalate regulatory costs, thereby creating incentives for
firms to go underground or shift services to less-regulated sectors. 171 Such "shadow
banks" operate largely out of sight of government bodies and can create risks that leak
into the broader economy. Information-forcing rules would avoid this costly dynamic.
168. See OMRi BEN-SHAHAR & CARL E. SCHNEIDER, MORE THAN You WANTED TO KNOW: THE
FAILURE OF MANDATED DISCLOSURE (2014).
169. See SEC. EXCH. COMM'N., SEC ANNOUNCES ENFORCEMENT INTrIATIVES TO COMBAT CYBER-
BASED THREATS AND PROTECT RETAIL INVESTORS (Sept. 25, 2016),
https://www.sec.gov/news/press-release/ 20 17 -176 .
170. While information disclosure may be low-cost, it is not no-cost. If firms are to provide
information in accessible and easily legible formats, there will necessarily be some costs
in collecting and disseminating this information. There will also, presumably, be costs
related to faulty disclosures that lead to losses for investors or counter-parties. But it is
hoped that these costs are relatively low compared with the overall benefits to the
industry, and liability regimes could potentially be structured to minimize costs for good
faith disclosures that end up being incorrect.
171. See Steven Schwarcz, Regulating Shadow Banking, 31 REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 619, 624
(2011).
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B. Security-Forcing Rules
In addition to improving information flows, the law of fintech must also focus on
increasing the security and resiliency of fintech platforms. It is now a fact of life that
online sites are subject to data breaches and hacking attacks on a daily basis. Such
breaches have targeted government databases, technology companies, and military
contractors. The seemingly unending series of disclosures about successful cyber-
intrusions into prominent corporations is troubling from a number of perspectives, but
it has particular salience to the financial industry. 172
The possibility - indeed, one might go so far as to say the inevitability - that an
ever greater portion of financial transactions will take place through online platforms
increases the urgency of putting in place laws that ensure that financial institutions
establish appropriate cyber-safeguards. This problem is not unique to fintech per se.
Even traditional financial institutions have struggled to prevent and respond to
hacking attacks. In 2014, for example, a cyberattack on JP Morgan is believed to have
compromised the private data of over 80 million customers. 173 The same year, a
hacking attempt that is suspected to have originated in Russia infiltrated the systems
of nine unidentified financial institutions. One official at the cyberdivision of the
Federal Bureau of Investigation has instructed financial institutions, "You're going to
be hacked. Have a plan." 174
Cybersecurity is of particular importance in the fintech industry, however, for a
number of reasons. First, since fintech firms tend to rely on mobile and online
platforms for their essential functions, they are especially dependent on the safety and
security of their systems. Second, given the relative newness of many of those systems
and technologies, the likelihood of unexpected or unknown vulnerabilities in their
cybersecurity systems is high. For example, in one of the more notorious examples of
the vulnerabilities of virtual currencies, in 2016, a hacker exploited a flaw in the coding
of an autonomous organization known as the DAO to steal $55 million of ethereum.
The vulnerability was created by the use of a lower case "t", rather than an upper case
"T", in line 666 of the code.175 Small mistakes or oversights in complex algorithms can
lead to significant losses.
Crafting a law of fintech that focuses on improving cybersecurity should
simultaneously promote all of the primary interests that financial regulation aims to
172. See MICHAEL E. BLEIER, TIMOTHY NAGLE & CHRISTOPHER J. FATHERLEY, THE CURRENT STATE
IN FINANCIAL SERVICES CYBERSECURITY (2013); Brian B. Kelly, Investing in a Centralized
Cybersecuritry Infrastructure: Why "Hacktivism" Can and Should Influence Cyber Security
Reform, 92 B.U. L. Rev. 1663 (2012); Peter M. Shane, Cybersecurity: Toward a Meaningful
Policy Framework, 90 TEx. L. REV. 87 (2012); Eric T. Jensen, Cyber Warfare and Precautions
Against the Effects of Attacks, 88 TEx. L. REv. 1533 (2010); Scott J. Shackelford & Scott Russell,
Operationalizing Cybersecurity Due Diligence: A Transatlantic Case Study, 67 S.C. L. REv. 609
(2016).
173. See Erin Kelly, Officials Warn 500 Million Financial Records Hacked, USA
TODAY (Oct. 20, 2014), https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2014/10/20/s
ecret-service-fbi-hack-cybersecuurity/17615029/.
174. Id.
175. See Leising, infra note 160.
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protect. It has consequences for the efficient allocation of capital because breaches of
cybersecurity protocols may lead to thefts or improper transfers of capital to criminals
and rogue states.176 It has consequences for consumer protection because hackers may
steal sensitive financial and personal information for individuals. 177  It has
consequences for systemic stability because cyber-intrusions may lead to markets or
transactions being frozen or seizing up.
178
Given the centrality of cybersecurity for the efficient, fair, and stable functioning
of the financial sector, and the particular vulnerability of fintech technologies to cyber-
intrusions, fintech regulation must place a special emphasis on ensuring that actors in
the sector implement proper systems and procedures for preventing, detecting, and
resolving cyberattacks. Current cybersecurity laws tend to be vague in substance and
generic in application. For example, the primary statute that the Federal Trade
Commission has used to prosecute corporations for failing to implement cybersecurity
procedures is 15 U.S.C. Section 45(a), which merely states that "unfair or deceptive acts
or practices in or affecting commerce" are unlawful.17 9 As one industry participant has
put it, "[t]he SEC hasn't been very specific about what it wants firms to do on
cybersecurity." 180 Such vagueness, while placing broad discretion within the hands of
regulators to prosecute companies for lax cybersecurity policies, fails to give
companies guidance about proper levels of cybersecurity.
Fintech law must remedy this problem by giving better guidance to firms about
the appropriate levels of protection that must be implemented before a firm may enter
into sensitive financial transactions. It can do so in several ways. First, regulations
should set forth minimum levels of cybersecurity preparedness that fintech firms must
implement.181 Such rules should address not just written policies and procedures, but
176. Prominent examples of thefts involving virtual currencies include the disappearance of
hundreds of thousands of bitcoins from the bitcoin exchange Mt. Gox in 2014 and the
hack of the ethereum-based DAO organization. See McMillan, supra note 41; Matthew
Leising, The Ether Thief, BLOOMBERG (June 13, 2017),
https://www.bloomberg.com/features/2017-the-ether-thief/.
177. In the Equifax hack of 2017, for example, hackers were able to expose the names,
addresses, birth dates, and Social Security numbers of over 140 million Americans. See
AnnaMaria Andriotis, Michael Rapoport & Robert McMillan, "We've Been Breached":
Inside the Equifax Hack, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 18,2017), https://www.wsj.com/articles/weve-
been-breached-inside-the-equfax-hack-1505 69 3 318 .
178. See Alexander Osipovich, Pentagon Turns to High-Speed Traders to Fortify
Markets Against Cyberattack, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 15, 2017), https://www.wsj.com/articles/
pentagon-turns-to-high-speed-traders-to-fortify-markets-against-cyberattack-
1508065202.
179. 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (2012); FED. TRADE COMM'N., 2016 PRIVACY AND DATA
SECURITY UPDATE (2016), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/reports/priva
cy-data-security-update-2016/privacy and data security update 2016_web.pdf.
180. See SEC to Advisors: Improve Cybersecurity Preparedness, BARRON'S (Aug. 9, 2017),
https://www.barrons.com/articles/sec-to-advisors-improve-cybersecurity-
preparedness-1502299978.
181. See, e.g., OFFICE OF COMPLIANCE INSPECTIONS & EXAMINATIONS, NATIONAL EXAM PROGRAM
RISK ALERT: OBSERVATIONS FROM CYBERSECURITY EXAMINATIONS (2017),
https://www.sec.gov/files/observations-from-cybersecurity-examinations.pdf
(hereinafter, OCIE REPORT); FIN. INDUS. REGULATORY AUTH., REPORT ON
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also employee training, regular inspections, and maintenance issues. These rules
should be tailored to address the particular cybersecurity concerns of the technology
at issue: virtual currency cybersecurity protocols, for example, might look quite
different from robo-advisor cybersecurity protocols.
Second, regulators should establish a "fintech cybersecurity" body that has the
ability and the expertise necessary to monitor and investigate cybersecurity practices
in the industry. 182 Such a body might be modeled on the National Examination
Program of the Securities Exchange Commission, which regularly undertakes
comprehensive examinations of cybersecurity procedures within the broker-dealer
industry. 183 The centralization of expertise and monitoring capabilities would
improve the ability of regulators to identify fintech vulnerabilities before they are
exploited.
Third, fintech law should not just set forth substantive standards and enable
regulators to enforce them, but it should also proactively encourage fintech firms to
engage with regulators on their cybersecurity procedures.1 84 Such engagement would
certainly include reporting intrusions and attempted intrusions, but it might also
include broader cooperative efforts. The Department of Homeland Security, for
example, offers free "cyberhygiene" scans of state voting systems.15 Such an approach
would be relatively low-cost and could provide significant benefits for the security and
stability of financial markets.
But of course, even the best cybersecurity procedures are not invulnerable to
breach, and thus the law of fintech should not just set forth substantive standards for
the kinds of protections that fintech firms must incorporate into their models, it should
also create rules governing how fintech firms must respond to breaches. This would
include at a minimum an obligation for firms to establish a plan for limiting the harm
CYBERSECURITY PRACTICES (2015), https://www.finra.org/sites/default/files/p602363%2 0Report%20on%20Cybersecurity%2OPractices_0.pdf; FED. FIN. INSTS. EXAMINATION
COUNCIL, FFIEC CYBERSECURITY ASSESSMENT TOOL: OVERVIEW FOR
CH-EF EXECUTrIVE OFFICERS AND BOARDS OF DIRECTORS (2015),
https://www.ffiec.gov/pdf/cybersecurity/FFIEC CAT CEO Board Overview-June 2
015_PDFl.pdf; NAT'L. INST. OF STANDARDS AND TECH., FRAMEWORK FOR IMPROVING
CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE CYBERSECURITY (2014),
https://www.nist.gov/sites/default/files/documents/cyberframework/cybersecurity-
framework-021214.pdf.
182. Brummer and Yadav propose that better coordination among agencies would improve
fintech regulation. Brummer & Yadav, supra note 4, at 57-59. They argue that
coordination "can help regulators pool their insights and improve their individual
analysis of an innovation in order to draw the lines (and stipulate acceptable tradeoffs)
that best represent their respective policy goals." Id. at 58. The fintech cybersecurity body
proposed in this Article could potentially serve as the forum for such coordination. It
could, for example, be an interagency body with representatives from multiple agencies,
or it could be an independent body that regularly advises other agencies.
183. See OCIE REPORT, supra note 165, at 1.
184. See Sam Young, Contemplating Corporate Disclosure Obligations Arising from Cybersecurity
Breaches, 38 J. CORP. L. 659 (2013).
185. See Michael Wines, Wary of Hackers, States Move to Upgrade Voting
Systems, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 14, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/14/us/voting-
russians-hacking-states-.html.
Spring 2018
Stanford Journal of Law, Business & Finance
from system breaches, as well as an obligation to report breaches immediately to the
relevant regulators. Too often, private firms fail to disclose breaches in a timely
manner, thus preventing regulators and consumers from taking steps to protect
themselves from harm stemming from the breaches.186 Given the centrality of financial
services, and financial information, to the modem economy, fintech firms must be held
to higher standards.
Imposing higher levels of cybersecurity obligations on fintech firms will certainly
be more intrusive than the disclosure obligations outlined in the previous section. It
will also require regulators to have exceptional knowledge and skill in deciding the
appropriate standards. Both of these facts suggest that regulators should tread
carefully, and solicit industry and interest-group feedback on proposed regulations,
before enacting comprehensive cybersecurity regulation aimed at the fintech sector.
But the cost of not doing so is large and difficult to calculate, given the capability for
cybertheft to work long-term damage to investor and consumer credit and confidence.
Thus, it must be at the center of any prudent attempt to improve the law of fintech.
C. Tradeoff-Forcing Rules
As described above, the law of fintech must prioritize information disclosure and
cybersecurity preparation, two areas in which fintech currently raises significant
concerns and which, if resolved, could provide benefits along all of financial
regulation's priorities. But a third aspect of fintech law is perhaps a less obvious one:
balancing priorities. While the first two features of fintech law require the creation of
substantive standards and behavioral requirements, this feature focuses instead on the
process and methods by which those standards are created. Fintech law must make
difficult choices about the priorities it seeks to realize, and in doing so, it will
necessarily require regulators to make tradeoffs between the core purposes of financial
regulation- efficiency, fairness and stability. These decisions should be made
consciously and explicitly. And while of course all regulation requires a balancing of
costs and benefits, the process is even more important in the fintech industry given the
disaggregated nature of fintech and its dispersed decisionmaking structure.
187
In their article, Fintech and the Innovation Trilemma, Chris Brummer and Yesha
Yadav demonstrate how financial regulators "when balancing three competing policy
objectives -fostering innovation, market integrity and rules simplicity -can, at best,
186. See Ted Lieu, We Need a Law Requiring Faster Disclosure of Data Breaches-
Now, SLATE (Sept. 15, 2017), http://www.slate.com/blogs/futureitense/201 7/O9 /15/re
p_tedlieu on the massive equifax databreach.html; Chris Isidore, Equifax's Delayed
Hack Disclosure: Did It Break the Law?, CNNTECH (Sept. .8, 2017),
http://money.cnn.com/2017/09/08/technology/equifax-hack-disclosure/index.html.
187. See Howell E. Jackson, Variation in the Intensity of Financial Regulation: Preliminary Evidence
and Potential Implications, 24 YALE J. ON REG. 253 (2007); John C. Coates IV, Cost-Benefit
Analysis of Financial Regulation: Case Studies and Implications, 124 YALE L.J. 882 (2015);
Brummer & Yadav, supra note 44, at 15-30 (arguing that fintech regulation faces a
"trilemma" preventing it from satisfying its three goals of clear rules, market integrity
and financial innovation).
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fully achieve two out of three of these regulatory goals." 188 While the goals they
identify for financial regulation differ from the goals that this Article identifies, and
their conclusions about tradeoffs are perhaps more straightforward than they are for
the three goals identified here, their ultimate conclusion is persuasive: regulations that
have multiple goals often end up sacrificing some goals for the sake of achieving the
others. For example, they argue that market integrity (which they define to include
such goals as financial stability, fraud prevention, and consumer protection) often
requires complex rules.18 9 As they put it, " [t]o comprehensively capture the interaction
of diverse market participants, a variety of rules of varying objectives are needed." 19°
This desire for market integrity, however, conflicts with the desire for simple rules -
if we want to protect against the variety of potentially undesirable behaviors in
markets, we will need to have rules with many facets to them. 191 At the same time,
these complex rules may also impede innovation -new entrants to markets may be
dissuaded from experimenting with new financial products if they are unable to
decipher the maze of financial rules. 192 Thus, financial regulation faces a "trilemma,"
as Brummer and Yadav call it, in which tradeoffs are unavoidable. 193 These tradeoffs
are exacerbated by fintech, Brummer and Yadav argue, because of fintech's core
features, including its reliance on automation, disintermediation, and big data.194
The tradeoffs that Brummer and Yadav identify are also present within the
overarching goals of financial regulation identified here: efficiency, fairness, and
stability. It is impossible for financial regulation to perfectly achieve all of its purposes,
as the pursuit of some of these purposes may simultaneously inhibit the pursuit of the
others. Efficient markets may at times lead to results that are perceived as unfair.
Strong consumer protection rules may lead to markets that are less efficient.
Regulation aimed to promote stability within a system may simultaneously reduce
efficiency or investor rights in the system. One might go further: it is unlikely that any
policies will fully achieve any of these goals, even if it is their sole goal. Thus, the
regulatory process must be an effort in maximizing several preferences, none of which
is fully achievable. These tradeoffs, seen in all financial regulation, are particularly
acute in the case of fintech.
Fintech markets, as mentioned before, tend to be heavily populated with small,
disaggregated actors. But small actors are precisely the kinds of actors that are least
able to bear regulatory costs. 195 Unlike large financial institutions, who employ
hundreds of lawyers to ensure compliance with the mosaic of laws that apply to them,
fintech companies tend to be leanly staffed and to rely on maintaining low overhead.
188. Brummer & Yadav, supra note 4, at 56.
189. Id. at 12.
190. Id.
191. Id. at 12-13.
192. Id. at 13.
193. Id.
194. Id. at 39-44.
195. See Jeff Schwartz, The Law and Economics of Scaled Equity Market Regulation, 39 J. CoRP. L.
347 (2014).
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Costly regulation that might be borne easily by large financial institutions might well
make the difference between a profitable and an unprofitable business in the fintech
world. 196 Indeed, to the extent that large financial institutions view fintech companies
as potential competitors, they may well push for regulations that impose large,
industry-wide costs on firms in order to increase the barriers to entry for fintech
companies. 197
Fintech firms are also more likely to be able to shift their activities to unregulated
or unobserved sectors.1 98 Unlike large financial institutions, which have no plausible
options for "going underground" or shifting their operations abroad in order to avoid
costly regulation, fintech firms have both the incentive and the means to restructure or
reorganize in response to regulatory costs. They are small and adaptable, and to the
extent that a new regulation imposes excessive costs, they are capable of redirecting
their operations to avoid those costs. Blockchain-based virtual currencies, for example,
have applications outside the currency realm, and companies that have an expertise in
one area can easily apply that expertise in another. 199
For these reasons, the law of fintech will face significantly more constraints on the
magnitude and breadth of its reach. Any regulation aimed at shoring up consumer
protection rules risks diverting fintech activity, either to other jurisdictions or to other
less-regulated use-cases. Similarly, regulation aimed at improving capital buffers in
fintech banking risks creating strong incentives for companies to set up abroad or
redefine their business models in ways that avoid the capital requirements. Fintech
firms are more elastic and responsive to regulatory costs than traditional finance, and
thus these tradeoffs can be expected to be faced sooner and more often than they
would be in traditional financial regulation.
The implications of this analysis are simple: politicians and regulators will need
to explicitly identify the priorities that they are seeking to pursue in regulating the
fintech industry. If the priority is to prop up systemic stability in the industry, then
doing so may come at a cost to consumer protection and efficiency. If the priority is to
protect consumers from ill-advised transactions, then doing so may create some
reduction in the system's efficiency and stability. And if the priority is to increase the
efficient allocation of capital in the system, then regulators may be forced to accept a
certain amount of risk and unfairness in the industry. These choices should be made
openly and publicly.
Too often, lawmakers fail to recognize the tradeoffs they are making in enacting
196. See Rory van Loo, Rise of the Digital Regulator, 66 DuKE L.J. 1267 (2017).
197. See Elizabeth Pollman & Jordan Barry, Regulatory Entrepreneurship, 90 S. CAL. L. REv. 383
(2017).
198. See Christina Parajon Skinner, Regulating NonBanks: A Plan for SIFI Lite, 105 GEO. L.J. 1379
(2017).
199. See Land Grab: Governments May Be Big Backers of the Blockchain, THE ECONOMIST (June 1,
2017), https://www.economist.com/news/business/21722869-anti-establishment-
technology-faces-ironic-turn-fortune-governments-may-be-big-backers (describing how
one company based in Tbilisi, Georgia, shifted from a business focused on mining bitcoin
to one focused on backing up Georgian government records).
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new rules.200 It is not uncommon, for example, for legislators and regulators to claim
that their new laws promote every possible desirable outcome -consumers will be
protected, markets will function better, and systems will be more resilient. 201 This
approach to regulation, while perhaps good politics, creates an environment in which
public discussion about priorities and relative preferences is suppressed. The
democratic legitimacy of laws depends on a conscious acceptance of the costs and
benefits of those laws.202
How can the law of fintech better balance the goals of financial regulation? As
described above, two specific reforms can provide significant benefits with relatively
low cost: better information and better cybersecurity. This kind of low-hanging fruit,
though, is quickly exhausted, and then more difficult tradeoffs will need to be
considered.
Two general paradigms, however, suggest themselves. First, regulators could
adopt a "maximalist" paradigm in which regulators seek greater control over fintech
markets, even at the cost of sensitive intrusions into markets. 203 One could, for
example, imagine a kind of Securities Act for fintech, under which new financial
innovations could only be launched after a long and comprehensive registration
process with federal authorities. Such a reform might reduce the potential for
consumer abuse or market instability, but it would likely come at the expense of
market efficiency: many beneficial innovations might be excluded from the market due
to the time and expense of registering the new financial product.
A second, "minimalist" paradigm for fintech would instead adopt a wait-and-see
approach, allowing fintech markets to develop with minimal intrusion from
regulations. 20 4 One could imagine, for example, a broad deregulatory effort for fintech,
one that would lead to reduced regulatory burdens for small fintech companies. Such
an approach would likely encourage market efficiency by reducing the cost of
innovation, and thus spurring companies to develop new financial services that reduce
transaction costs. But at the same time, it would likely decrease the ability of regulators
to patrol the market to prevent consumer fraud. It could also increase systemic risk if
200. See, e.g., Timur Kuran & Cass R. Sunstein, Availability Cascades and Risk Regulation, 51 Stan.
L. Rev. 683 (1999); Gary M. Lucas, Jr., Out of Sight, Out of Mind: How Opportunity Cost
Neglect Undermines Democracy, 9 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 249 (2015).
201. See, e.g., George W. Bush, Remarks on Signing the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of
2002 (July 30, 2002), available at http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=
73333; Barack Obama, President Obama Signs Wall Street Reform: "No Easy Task"(July 21, 2010), available at https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/blog/2010/07/21/
president-obama-signs-wall-street-reform-no-easy-task.
202. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Legitimacy and the Constitution, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1787 (2005)(describing the three types of legitimacy in constitutional law).
203. For examples of such an approach to fintech regulation, see Lawrence G. Baxter, Adaptive
Financial Regulation and RegTech: A Concept Article on Realistic Protection for Victims of Bank
Failure, 66 DuKE L.J. 567 (2016); William S. Warren, The Frontiers of Peer-to-Peer Lending:
Thinking About a New Regulatory Approach, 14 DuKE L. & TECH. REV. 298 (2016).
204. For examples of a minimalist regime for fintech, see Angela Walch, The Path of the
Blockchain Lexicon (And the Law), 36 REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 713 (2017); Douglas W. Arner,
Janos Barberis & Ross P. Buckley, The Evolution of Fintech: A New Post-Crisis Paradigm, 47
GEO. J. INT'L L. 1271 (2016).
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complex new financial products are put on the market without a full understanding of
how they might interact with other forms of finance.
20 5
These two paradigms of fintech regulation are of course not specific regulatory
dictates, but rather legislative baselines that might inform the lawmaking process and
enforcement efforts. They are also located at two sides of the spectrum, one involving
a "light touch" approach to regulation and the other involving more heavy-handed
intrusions into markets. The ultimate regulatory regime for fintech will likely fall
somewhere along the spectrum, rather than at the extreme ends of it. But forcing
regulators to identify where they fall along the spectrum, and the costs that are
involved in doing so, would provide welcome transparency to the industry.
IV. Objections
This Article has argued that it is time for a "law of fintech" that focuses on
increasing information flows, bolstering cybersecurity measures, and identifying
policy tradeoffs. ""With these outlines of the law of fintech now established, it is worth
considering a set of potential objections to the approach proposed here. This Part
addresses two prominent critiques in the financial regulation literature that, if fully
accepted, would require significant changes to the regulatory regime set forth in this
Article. First, it is often argued that disclosure-oriented reforms are ineffective because
information-forcing laws are either unnecessary -markets will naturally lead actors
with valuable information to disclose that information to those lacking it-or
unhelpful -consumers and investors are unlikely to change their behavior based on
new information. Second, many scholars have argued that there is a tradeoff between
cybersecurity and national security, and where the two conflict, national security must
trump.These objections raise important questions about the wisdom of a project to
establish a regulatory regime for fintech based on greater information, better security,
and more open weighing of priorities, and this Part will address them in turn.
A. The Ineffectiveness of Information
As described above in Part III.A, information asymmetries are a powerful source
of market failure. If one party to a transaction cannot fully assess the costs and benefits
of that transaction, then the party lacking information may be deceived into poor deals
or, just as likely, refrain from engaging in the market in the first place. 206 In either
scenario, the scope for mutually beneficial agreements in the market is narrowed,
205. Brummer and Yadav assert, rightly, that some approaches that are often identified with
a minimalist paradigm could in fact be used to impose heavy costs on fintech firms.
Brummer & Yadav, supra note 4, at 44. For example, the regulatory sandboxes that several
jurisdictions have created, in which fintech firms operate under reduced regulatory
restrictions in return for increased monitoring by regulators, could potentially be
structured in order to ensure that fintech firms fully internalize the costs of their business
models. Id.
206. See Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Mandatory Disclosure and the Protection of
Investors, 70 VA. L. REV. 669, 670 (1984) (noting that the securities laws were justified by
the need to prevent fraud on the market, ensure that investors received the returns they
expected, and prevent people from withdrawing their capital due to such behavior).
Vol 23:2200
Financial Regulation in the Bitcoin Era
thereby creating a situation ripe for market failure. 207
For this reason, many financial regulations adopt a disclosure-oriented approach
to market reform. 208 For example, the Securities Exchange Act requires companies that
seek to issue securities to the public to provide extensive disclosure about the
companies' business, past operations, and risks. 209 The Sarbanes Oxley Act requires
companies to disclose off-balance sheet items that had allowed companies like Enron
to hide the true costs of their business and present an overly optimistic portrait of their
prospects for profit.210 The Dodd-Frank Act authorizes the Securities Exchange
Commission to issue "point-of-sale" disclosure rules requiring broker-dealers to
include information about costs and conflicts of interest whenever investors bought
financial products. 211 The rationale behind these information-forcing rules is to
improve the functioning of markets by preventing fraud and empowering investors.
But in recent years, disclosure-oriented reforms have come under harsh criticism.
A number of scholars have argued that increasing the quantity of disclosure to
investors and consumers is an ineffectual response to the problems that regulators care
about. Information-forcing rules, in this view, tend to inhibit market efficiency, not
promote it.212
The criticisms of disclosure-oriented regulation can be categorized into two
groups. First, one group of scholars, who might usefully be termed "disclosure
optimists," argue that markets will naturally lead to an efficient level of disclosure. 213
207. See Stiglitz, supra note 90, at 1445.
208. See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 206, at 670 ("The dominating principle of securities
regulation is that anyone willing to disclose the right things can sell or buy whatever he
wants at whatever price the market will sustain.").
209. See Charles R. Korsmo, The Audience for Corporate Disclosure, 102 IOWA L. REV. 1581, 1590-
99 (2017).
210. See Jeffrey N. Gordon, Governance Failures of the Enron Board and the New Information Order
of Sarbanes-Oxley (Colum. L. Sch. Ctr. for L. & Econ. Stud., Working Paper No. 215, 2003).
211. See Nicholas S. Di Lorenzo, Defining a New Punctilio of an Honor: The Best Interest Standard
for Broker Dealers, 92 B.U. L. REv. 291 (2012).
212. See Geoffrey A. Manne, The Hydraulic Theory of Disclosure Regulation and Other Costs of
Disclosure, 58 ALA. L. REv. 473, 474 (2007) (arguing that "mandatory disclosure in certain
circumstances will have undesirable consequences - costs borne by shareholders - that
could outweigh its perceived benefits").
213. See Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior,
Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 306 (1976) (arguing that firm
managers voluntarily provide accounting reports and hire independent auditors in order
to, among other things, attract investors to their firms; Stephen A. Ross, The Economics of
Information and the Disclosure Regulation Debate, ISSUES IN FIN. REG. 177, 184-85 (Franklin R.
Edwards ed., 1979) ("[I]n a competitive market (with no mandated disclosure), the
managers of firms.., will have a strong self-interest in disclosing relevant
information...."); Paul M. Healy & Krishna G. Palepu, Information Asymmetry, Corporate
Disclosure, and the Capital Markets: A Review of the Empirical Disclosure Literature, 31 J. AcCr.
& ECON. 405, 411 (2001) ("Absent market imperfections or externalities, firms have
incentives to optimally trade off the costs and benefits of voluntary disclosure, and to
produce the efficient level of information for investors in the economy."); Troy A.
Paredes, Blinded by the Light: Information Overload and Its Consequences for Securities
Regulation, 81 WASH. U. L.Q. 417, 421 (2003) ("Critics... argue that a company will
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Disclosure optimists view information asymmetries as problems that are entirely
resolvable through private-sector mechanisms. The logic is as follows. Buyers that
lack information about the relative quality of financial products (say, asset
management services) will refrain from buying those products until they have
received credible information about their value. While providers of low-quality
financial products will have an interest in maintaining information asymmetries
between themselves and buyers, providers of high-quality financial products will
not.214 These "reputable" financial services firms will be willing to provide the
necessary amount of information to signal to prospective buyers that their products
are of high quality. This disclosure will eliminate any material and harmful
information asymmetries in the market. Thus, in this view, markets will naturally
correct any information asymmetries that are harmful to consumers and investors.
According to disclosure optimists, then, disclosure-oriented regulation will either be
duplicative (to the extent that it requires firms to disclosure information they already
are providing) or harmful (to the extent that it requires firms to disclosure information
that counterparties neither need nor desire).
But a second group of "disclosure pessimist" scholars have criticized disclosure-
oriented financial regulation on another front: consumers and investors do not have
the cognitive capacity to process the information that is disclosed. 215 In this view,
markets may well not lead to effective disclosure to counterparties, but enacting
mandatory disclosure rules will not solve the problem either. First, consumers and
voluntarily disclose information that investors demand in order to reduce its cost of
capital and avoid any discount that the market might apply to the company's stock price
if investors think that they have too little information to evaluate the company and its
securities properly or, worse yet, if investors think that the company is hiding
something."); Pablo Kurlat & Laura Veldkamp, Should We Regulate Financial Information?,
158 J. ECON. THEORY 697 (2015); Jonathan R. Macey, Efficient Capital Markets, Corporate
Disclosure and Enron, 89 CORNELL L. REv. 394, 411 (2004) ("Economic theory as it relates to
disclosure dictates that high-quality corporations seeking to attract capital have strong
incentives to distinguish themselves from rivals because investors that cannot distinguish
high- from low-quality issuers will not pay more for securities from high-quality
issuers.").
214. Of course, the low-quality providers might have an interest in providingfalse information
to investors and consumers, but, under the optimistic theory of disclosure, prohibitions
against fraud should prevent this kind of behavior. In addition, high-quality providers
could remedy this problem even in the face of fraudulent disclosure by hiring
independent auditors to confirm the accuracy of their own, true disclosures.
215. See BEN-SHAHAR & SCHNEIDER, supra note 153, at 33-54; Omri Ben-Shahar & Carl E.
Schneider, The Failure of Mandated Disclosure, 159 U. PA. L. REv. 647, 705 (2011) (arguing
that mandated disclosure's assumptions "that people want to make all the consequential
decisions about their lives, and that they want to do so by assembling all the relevant
information, reviewing all the possible outcomes, reviewing all their relevant values, and
deciding which choice best promotes their preferences" ... "so poorly describe[ how
human beings live that mandated disclosure cannot reliably improve people's decisions
and thus cannot be a dependable regulatory mechanism"); Henry T.C. Hu, Too Complex
to Depict? Innovation, "Pure Information," and the SEC Disclosure Paradigm, 90 TEX. L. REV.
1601, 1607 (2012) (arguing that "the complexities of financial innovation may be so
daunting that no one at the [company] understands such complexities"); Paredes, supra
note 213, at 419 (arguing that investors may be "overloaded with information and make
worse decisions than if less information were made available to them").
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investors face an acquisition problem: they may not be aware of the existence or
availability of much relevant information, such as OCC guidelines or SEC alerts or
NIST frameworks, even if this information is disclosed. 216 Second, consumers and
investors face an overload problem: many of the disclosures they are provided are so
detailed and complex- consider, for example, the extensive information provided in
the most basic SEC disclosure document, the annual report on Form 10-K -that they
are unable to understand and analyze these disclosures. 217 Finally, consumers and
investors face an accumulation problem: they have access to so much information from
so many different sources that, given limited time and cognitive resources, it is
impossible for them to review and understand all of the information that is provided
to them. 218 For all of these reasons, disclosure pessimists conclude that additional
information just is not very helpful for consumers, because they either fail to receive it
or fail to process it in a useful way. These issues are part of a larger conceptual problem
related to the use of disclosure. After all, the purpose of disclosure is to prevent
substantive problems, such as information asymmetries or fraud. If mandated
disclosure does not lead to better decisionmaking, then it is both an ineffectual use of
scarce regulatory resources and a harmful imposition of burdensome regulatory costs.
The arguments against mandated disclosure leveled by both disclosure optimists
and disclosure pessimists provide compelling reasons for regulators to be cautious in
enacting broad information disclosure rules on markets. Without a detailed
understanding of existing, privately-negotiated disclosures, and the behavioral
tendencies and capacities of disclosure recipients, lawmakers may well be wise to
refrain from intervening in well-functioning industries. Intervention in such cases
may end up exacerbating the problems that disclosure is intended to solve.219 But, for
a number of reasons, the critiques of the disclosure optimists and the disclosure
pessimists are less compelling in the fintext context.
The argument of disclosure optimists that markets will naturally lead to efficient
levels of disclosure in fintech demonstrates a misunderstanding of the dynamics
within fintech industries. First, market mechanisms for information work less well for
the kinds of complex products that fintech offers. 220 It is one thing to expect
homebuyers to demand information about defects in their homes (one common
example given of market demand for information to resolve information
asymmetries). It is another to expect investors in virtual currency platforms to demand
information about the risks of blockchain- even computer scientists disagree about
the functioning of the technologies underlying many virtual currencies. Even
knowing the right questions to ask requires significant levels of technical knowledge
that most investors do not have. Second, even if the dynamics of supply and demand
will eventually lead to better disclosure of the quality of fintech products, this process
216. See Ben-Shahar & Schneider, supra note 191, at 689-90.
217. See id. at 687-89.
218. See id. at 689-90.
219. Id.
220. See John C. Coffee, Jr., Market Failure and the Economic Case for a Mandatory Disclosure
System, 70 VA. L. REV. 717 (1984); Merritt B. Fox, Retaining Mandatory Securities Disclosure:
VWhy Issuer Choice Is Not Investor Empowerment, 85 VA. L. REV. 1335 (1999).
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takes time and will itself involve significant transaction costs. In a sector where new
fintech products are launched, and new actors are created, on a nearly daily basis,
transaction costs for information production are likely to be high. Third, even if
market mechanisms function properly, and transaction costs can be minimized, it is
unclear that proper levels of information will be disclosed by fintech actors. The
information that investors will demand, and that companies will provide, will be
determined based on the investment concerns of participants in the market. But, as
described above, fintech also presents systemic risk concerns that affect the economy
more broadly and not just the immediate participants in the industry. These
externalities are potentially large and likely growing. By leaving out the interests of
third parties, market mechanisms for disclosure will lead to suboptimal levels of
information from the perspective of society more generally. Thus, there are several
reasons to believe that market mechanisms for information will function poorly in
fintech.
What, then, to make of the argument of disclosure pessimists, who view
consumers as generally incapable of using disclosures to improve their decision-
making? This is certainly a powerful critique of disclosure as a panacea for undesirable
behavior in an industry. It seems quite clear that it is beyond the capacity of most, if
not all, consumers to review the extensive amount of disclosure provided to them in
nearly every aspect of their online lives, from terms of service pages to clickwrap to
dispute resolution agreements. But to say that disclosure is sometimes ineffective, or
even that it may lead to worse behavior than if no disclosure had existed, is not to say
that it cannot be useful in areas in which large information asymmetries exist. More
importantly, a number of insights from behavioral psychology suggest that there are
ways to improve disclosure in order to make it more effective in altering consumer
behavior. For example, consumers may be "primed" to review disclosures in a more
analytical light through a variety of debiasing methods aimed at mitigating or
eliminating cognitive shortcomings. 221 These might include "consider the opposite"
disclosures asking consumers or investors to assess their decision under differing
221. See Christine Jolls & Cass R. Sunstein, Debiasing Through Law, 35 J. LEGAL STUD. 199, 201
(2006) (providing a general account of how law may debias people's boundedly rational
behavior); Carla C. Chandler et al., It Can't Happen to Me... Or Can It? Conditional Base
Rates Affect Subjective Probability Judgments, 5 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL.: APPLIED 361, 365-
67 (1999); Linda Babcock & George Loewenstein, Explaining Bargaining Impasse: The Role
of Self-Serving Biases, 11 J. ECON. PERSP. 109, 110 (1997); Alexander J. Rothman & Marc T.
Kiviniemi, Treating People with Information: An Analysis and Review of Approaches to
Communicating Health Risk Information, 25 J. NAT'L. CANCER INST. MONOGRAPHS 44, 45
(1999); Alexander J. Rothman et al., Absolute and Relative Biases in Estimations of Personal
Risk, 26 J. APPLIED Soc. PSYCHOL. 1213, 1213-36 (1996). But see Sean Hannon Williams,
Sticky Expectations: Responses to Persistent Over-Optimism in Marriage, Employment
Contracts, and Credit Card Use, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 733 (2009) (arguing that there are
multiple reasons to doubt that debiasing strategies would be effective in a number of
areas of law); Neil D. Weinstein & William M. Klein, Resistance of Personal Risk Perceptions
to Debiasing Interventions, 14 HEALTH PSYCHOL. 132 (1995) (finding that the use of certain
debiasing methods with respect to health risks led to increased prevalence and magnitude
in cognitive biases).
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assumptions22 2 or "pros and cons" requirements forcing consumers to proactively list
both the benefits and costs of their financial transactions. 223 Additionally, consumers
and investors could be encouraged to make better use of disclosures through legal
obligations on firms to use certain "framing" techniques. 2 4 These framing obligations
might require firms to provide consumers and investors with immediate and repeated
disclosures about the potential negative consequences of their behavior.
All of this is not to say that mandated disclosure can completely eliminate
cognitive biases or uninformed decisionmaking by consumers. It certainly cannot. But
given the large information asymmetries currently existing in the industry, even a
marginal improvement in the capability of outsiders to assess the benefits and risks of
their financial transactions could provide significant benefits in the efficiency, fairness
and stability of these markets.
Perhaps just as importantly, information forcing is not solely about improving the
decisionmaking of actors within fintech markets. It is also about enabling and
strengthening the capacity of regulators to monitor and constrain those markets. And
while regulators are not immune to the types of behavioral biases that afflict private
sector actors, their role as governmental actors puts them in a unique position to
correct misbehavior as it develops. Improving information disclosure for regulators
may well involve mechanisms that are not typically seen in the private sector. One
proposal that has seen growing support internationally is the creation of "regulatory
sandboxes" for fintech firms. 225 These governmental initiatives would encourage (or
potentially require) fintech firms to launch new financial products under the active
supervision of financial regulators. In return, fintech firms would receive reduced
regulatory burdens and registration requirements. The benefits of a sandbox approach
to fintech regulation are multifold, including, perhaps most importantly, that it would
allow regulators to gain insight into the workings of financial products and do at an
early stage, before risks materialize into real-world losses.
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United States, see Hilary J. Allen, A US Regulatory Sandbox (unpublished manuscript)(available at www.ssrn.com/abstract-id=3056993).
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B. Cybersecurity and National Security
A second objection often lodged against efforts to improve the cryptographic
power of technologies is that these efforts may raise national security concerns. This
Article has argued that financial regulators must enact rules requiring fintech firms to
adopt a set of best practices for cybersecurity to ensure that their systems are protected
from unauthorized intrusions. Such a rule, this Article has argued, would promote
efficient markets, protect consumers, and strengthen stability. But cybersecurity is not
an unalloyed good. Governments may at times perceive an interest in "breaking" or
penetrating the security protocols of financial firms in order to gain access to valuable
information. Such governmental interests may clash with privacy and system
integrity goals. In these scenarios, it is unclear that cybersecurity should always win
out. Indeed, if all financial services were to have fully anonymous and impenetrable
systems, it would be impossible for regulators to discover wrongdoing in the financial
system.
The tradeoff between cybersecurity and national security has risen to national
prominence following several recent disclosures about the ability (or in some cases
inability) of governments to access information stored or transmitted on computers,
mobile phones or other online platforms. In one incident that received substantial
coverage in the media, the Federal Bureau of Investigation sought to access data stored
on the iPhone of one of the terrorists in the 2015 attack in San Bernardino that killed
14 people and injured 22 others. 226 Apple, the maker of the phone, protested that the
FBI's demands that it create such a backdoor into the phone by breaking its encryption
would have harmful and unintended effects for future privacy, noting that "[i]n the
physical world, it would be the equivalent of a master key, capable of opening
hundreds of millions of locks - from restaurants and banks to stores and home."
227
Eventually, the FBI relented on its demand after it found hackers that managed to
break the encryption on their own, at a reported cost of under $1 million.2
The dispute between FBI and Apple is symptomatic of the basic tension between
cybersecurity and national security. 229 Efforts to strengthen encryption within a
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system will naturally tend to increase privacy and stability, thus protecting the system
from hacking or other unauthorized intrusions. But those same efforts will also tend
to reduce the ability of national governments to gain access to those systems. And
there are legitimate reasons for national governments to do so. These reasons include,
but are certainly not limited to, a desire to monitor communications by criminals and
terrorists, prevent money laundering and other illicit activities, locate assets and
accounts of citizens that are evading taxes, and protect consumers from fraud. In each
of these areas, the government's ability to pursue its policy priorities comes squarely
into conflict with basic cybersecurity priorities.
This tension is particularly visible in fintech for several reasons. First, many
fintech industries, and in particular the virtual currency market, focus on providing
both confidentiality and irreversibility for the transactions executed on their networks.
Bitcoin has been the currency of choice for hackers, drug cartels and human traffickers
because of its anonymity. 230 New virtual currencies such as monero promise even
greater anonymity to their users. 231 Second, the vulnerability of fintech to hacking,
and the potential harm from intrusions into fintech systems, makes cybersecurity an
essential component of fintech's business model. If robo-advisors or e-payment
services were known to have had breaches of their services, it could potentially destroy
the companies involved, especially if those breaches led to customer losses. 232
Consumer confidence about the strength of cybersecurity is, thus, of tremendous value
to fintech firms.2 33 Third, the governmental interest in accessing fintech networks is
high. As greater and greater proportions of financial transactions are handled by
fintech firms, governments seeking to regulate and monitor the world of finance will
seek ways to gain greater insight into its functioning. They may well attempt to break
the encryption in virtual currencies and payment systems in order to identify
wrongdoers and track down illicit funds.234 They may also try to force robo-advisors
around the world to provide information on customer accounts. 235
Thus, any legal regime that aims to strengthen fintech's encryption protocols risks
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weakening governments' ability to pursue other policy priorities. 236 Society may be
better served by creating a financial system that is easily accessible and monitorable
than in ensuring its resilience and impenetrability from cyberattacks. If the cost of
increasing fintech's cybersecurity is that governments can no longer track illicit flows
of capital, then government may well prefer to prohibit (not encourage) such
developments.
This dichotomy between cybersecurity and national security is unsurprising. It
has been seen over and over again in debates about civil liberties, government powers,
public safety, and the war against terrorism.237 The proper balance between protecting
the privacy of individuals and empowering the government to prevent harm to the
public is still a matter of controversy, and it will likely continue to be one.
But the position that cybersecurity necessarily comes at a cost to national security
is untenable. There are many commonsense rules that can both allow financial
transactions to be processed securely and protect important national security interests.
For example, incentivizing financial firms to identify flaws in software that would
allow unauthorized intrusions makes sense regardless of whether our goal is to protect
privacy or prevent crime. Requiring fintech firms to report when they have been the
subject of a hacking attack (whether successful or not) contributes to consumer privacy
interests and alerts law enforcement to potentially unlawful activity. Creating a set of
cybsecurity best practices and offering "cyber-hygiene" scans to fintech firms would
help ensure financial stability and mitigate concerns about criminal intrusions.
Of course, difficult questions about particular fintech technologies will arise - and
indeed, already have.238 Should governments have the power to seize virtual currency
assets that are known to have been the product of criminal activity, even if doing so
requires changes to the virtual currency's underlying code? Must online payment
systems create backdoors that allow prosecutors to identify the senders and recipients
of financial transactions? Can governments prohibit the creation of fintech
technologies that are truly impossible to decrypt or intercept? Creating a truly
comprehensive law of fintech will require answers to these questions. But as with any
emerging technology of the size and importance of fintech, regulation will never be
able to perfectly satisfy all stakeholders. Instead, it should aim to effectively achieve
its primary goals -in this case, efficiency, fairness, and stability. Better cybersecurity
would be a good start.
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Conclusion
The rise of the Bitcoin era has reshaped the landscape of finance. Fintech firms
have challenged the conventional wisdom about the way that financial services are
provided and how financial institutions must look. They have pioneered innovations
in the world of wealth management, capital formation, and virtual currencies. In all
of these areas, fintech firms have relied a set of core characteristics to compete with
longstanding incumbents -they utilize disaggregated networks to provide financial
services to consumers and investors; their services are heavily automated and often
delegated to algorithms; and their industries are highly adaptable, responding rapidly
to changes in demand. These features are in many ways a boon to the financial world,
as they allow for lower costs and broader access to financial products. But they also
present thorny problems for financial regulation. Fintech industries reduce the ability
of financial markets to promote the efficient allocation of capital in the economy. They
create greater opportunities for consumer abuse and investor fraud. And finally, they
present a set of systemic risks that are distinct from, and in certain aspects greater than,
the risks presented by traditional financial institutions. For all of these reasons, the
Bitcoin era will require us to engage in a comprehensive rethinking of financial
regulation. This reconceptualization of financial regulation must focus much more
closely on improving information production in fintech markets, bolstering
cybersecurity procedures among fintech participants, and balancing core priorities. If
financial regulators use these guideposts to hone their regulatory mechanisms in
coming years, they will do much to make financial regulation relevant again.
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